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DEFINING UNREASONABLY EXCLUSIONARY
CONDUCT: THE "EXCLUSION OF A
COMPETITIVE RIVAL" APPROACH*
THOMAS A. LAMBERT**

Unreasonably exclusionary conduct, the element common to
monopolization and attempted monopolization offenses under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, remains essentially undefined.
Federal courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, have
purportedto define the term, but the definitions they have offered
are so indeterminate as to be, in the words of one prominent
commentator, "not just vague but vacuous." Seeking to fill the
void left by the courts, antitrust scholars have in recent years
proposed four universal definitions of unreasonably
exclusionary conduct. Each, however, is deficient: one would fail
to deter a substantialamount of anticompetitive conduct, and the
other three would provide business planners with little guidance
and no safe harbors, and would likely chill efficient but novel
business practices. In light of these deficiencies, some
commentators have recently suggested abandoningthe searchfor
a universal definition of unreasonably exclusionary conduct and
instead adopting non-universal standards. Such an approach,
though, would either offend rule-of-law norms or, if
implemented as some non-universalists have suggested, reduce to
one of the aforementioned-anddeficient-universaldefinitions.
This Article examines the proposed definitions or tests for
identifying unreasonably exclusionary conduct (including the
non-universalist approach) and, finding each lacking, suggests
an alternative definition. The proposed approach would deem
conduct to be unreasonably exclusionary if it would exclude
from the defendant's market a "competitive rival," defined as a
rival that is both as determined as the defendant and capable, at
minimum efficient scale, of matching the defendant's efficiency.
The "exclusion of a competitive rival" definition identifies the
@ 2014 Thomas A. Lambert.
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key common thread running through instances of unreasonable
exclusion, comports with widely accepted intuitions about what
constitutes improper competitive conduct, and generates specific
safe harbors and liability rules that collectively would maximize
monopolization doctrine's net benefits by minimizing the sum of
its "decision" and "error"costs.
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INTRODUCTION

There is a problem with Section 2 of the Sherman Act: nobody
knows what it means. The provision forbids monopolization, attempts
to monopolize, and conspiracies to monopolize,' and courts have
articulated formal lists of elements for each of those offenses.2 But the
element common to the unilateral offenses of monopolization and
attempted
monopolization-"exclusionary
conduct"-remains
essentially undefined.'
We do know that more than the mere "exclusion" of a
defendant's rivals is required. All sorts of output-enhancing
practices-basic product improvements and nonpredatory discounts,
1. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) ("Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be
deemed guilty of a felony . . . ").
2. See, e.g., Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993) (defining
attempted monopolization); United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966)
(listing elements of monopolization); United States Anchor Mfg., Inc. v. Rule Indus., Inc.,
7 F.3d 986, 1001 (11th Cir. 1993) (describing conspiracy to monopolize); Int'l Distrib. Ctrs.,
Inc. v. Walsh Trucking Co., 812 F.2d 786, 795 (2d Cir. 1987) (outlining conspiracy to
monopolize elements).
3. Monopolization and attempted monopolization are unilateral offenses because
they may be accomplished by a single economic entity acting alone. Conspiracy to
monopolize, by contrast, requires concerted conduct. The elements of monopolization are
"(1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful
acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as
a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident." Grinnell, 384
U.S. at 570-71. The latter element is usually referred to as "exclusionary" conduct. See,
e.g., PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 3 ANTITRUST LAW

1

618 at 66 (3d

ed. 2008) ("The §2 monopolizing offense requires something more than the existence of
monopoly power; the 'something more' is generally referred to as an 'exclusionary
practice.' "). To establish attempted monopolization, a plaintiff must establish "(1) that
the defendant has engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct with (2) a specific
intent to monopolize and (3) a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power."
Spectrum Sports, 506 U.S. at 456. Courts have deemed the first element of the attempted
monopolization offense to be identical to the exclusionary conduct element of a
monopolization offense. See, e.g., Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
797 F.2d 370, 373 (7th Cir. 1986) ("Conduct lawful for a monopolist is lawful for a firm
attempting to become a monopolist."); Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 698
F.2d 1377, 1382 (9th Cir. 1983) ("Conduct that does not constitute 'willful acquisition or
maintenance' of monopoly power (thus precluding establishment of the offense of
monopolization) cannot constitute the 'predatory or anticompetitive conduct' required to
establish the offense of attempt to monopolize."); JULIAN 0. VON KALINOWSKI, PETER
SULLIVAN & MAUREEN McGuIRL 2-26 ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION

§ 26.01 (2d ed. 2013) (Lexis) ("The same analysis applies in deciding whether conduct is
anticompetitive in both monopolization and attempted monopolization cases.").
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for example-tend to win business for the perpetrator and thereby
reduce sales opportunities for its rivals. Although "exclusionary" in a
literal sense, such practices are hardly deserving of condemnation.
Only unreasonablyexclusionary conduct should be condemned.
Courts have provided little assistance in defining unreasonably
exclusionary conduct. The U.S. Supreme Court has said that such
conduct consists of "the willful acquisition or maintenance of
[monopoly] power as distinguished from growth or development as a
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic
accident."' But that is an unhelpful definition; virtually every firm
"wills" to win business from its rivals and thereby attain monopoly
power.' Recognizing as much, courts have emphasized that
exclusionary conduct must involve practices other than "competition
on the merits."6 But what exactly is that? As Einer Elhauge has
observed, these verbal formulae are "not just vague but vacuous"
because they "are utterly conclusory, failing to identify a coherent
norm that provides any real help in distinguishing bad behavior from
good or even in knowing which way certain factual conclusions cut."I
What courts and business planners need is something akin to the
Hand Formula for identifying negligence. Judge Learned Hand's
observation that the failure to take a precaution is negligent if
B<PL-i.e., if the cost or "burden" of taking the precaution is less
than the "probability" that harm will occur absent the precaution
times the magnitude of "loss" resulting from such harms-helpfully
operationalized the negligence concept, grounding it in economic
4. Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 571.
5. See Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 920 F. Supp. 455, 465
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("Unfortunately, the Grinnell test is not of much assistance in resolving
particular cases. Every competitor seeks to capture as much business as possible.").
6. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605
n.32 (1985) (observing that exclusionary conduct must impair rivals and either "not further
competition on the merits or do[] so in an unnecessarily restrictive way" (quoting 3 P.
AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw 78 (1978))); Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm

Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 308 (3d Cir. 2007) ("Anticompetitive conduct may take a variety of
forms, but it is generally defined as conduct to obtain or maintain monopoly power as a
result of competition on some basis other than the merits."); Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534, 545-46 (9th Cir. 1983) (defining unreasonably
exclusionary as conduct that "constitutes an anticompetitive abuse or leverage of
monopoly power, or a predatory or exclusionary means of attempting to monopolize the
relevant market, rather than aggressive competition on the merits").
7. Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards,56 STAN. L. REv. 253,
255 (2003).
8. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) ("[I]f the
probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B
is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B [is less than] PL.").
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efficiency and providing far more guidance to adjudicators and
business planners than had previous verbal formulae like "due care,"
"reasonable precaution," "reasonable prudence," etc.9 An ideal
definition of unreasonably exclusionary conduct would similarly
enhance the efficiency of monopolization doctrine and provide
reliable guidance to courts, regulators, and business planners.
The foregoing observations are nothing new. For more than a
decade now, antitrust commentators have debated how to define
unreasonably exclusionary conduct. Four possible universal
definitions have emerged: (1) Judge Richard Posner's "equally
efficient rival" approach,"o (2) post-Chicago theorists' "raising rivals'
costs" approach," (3) the consumer welfare effects test set forth in
the leading antitrust treatise,12 and (4) the profit sacrifice or "no
economic sense" test the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") once
endorsed. 3 In addition to those universal approaches, some
commentators have eschewed a generally applicable theory of
exclusionary conduct and called instead for evaluating different
categories of exclusionary conduct according to different criteria.14
This Article takes issue with all of these positions. Judge Posner's
equally efficient rival definition would fail to deter a fair amount of
anticompetitive conduct." The other proposed universal definitions
would be difficult for adjudicators to apply, would provide little
9. See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32 (1972)
(describing Hand's "famous formulation of the negligence standard" as "one of the few
attempts to give content to the deceptively simple concept of ordinary care").
10. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 194-95 (2d ed. 2001).
11. See, e.g., Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion:
Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 213-14 (1986).
12. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, 651a at 96.
13. See Brief for the United States and the FTC as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 15, Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398
(2004) (No. 02-682), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f200500/200558.htm
(advocating for the no economic sense test); see also A. Douglas Melamed, Exclusive
Dealing Arrangements and Other Exclusionary Conduct-Are There Unifying Principles?,
73 ANTITRUST L.J. 375, 391-92 (2006) (espousing the no economic sense test); Janusz A.
Ordover & Robert D. Willig, An Economic Definition of Predation:Pricingand Product
Innovation, 91 YALE L.J. 8, 9 (1981) (describing the profit sacrifice test); Gregory J.
Werden, Identifying Exclusionary Conduct Under Section 2: The "No Economic Sense"
Test, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 413, 415-25 (2006) (detailing the no economic sense test).
14. See, e.g., Marina Lao, Defining Exclusionary Conduct Under Section 2: The Case
for Non-Universal Standards, in ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORDHAM
COMPETITION LAW INSTITUTE: INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW AND POLICY 433, 435
(Barry E. Hawk ed., 2007); Mark S. Popofsky, Defining Exclusionary Conduct: Section 2,
the Rule of Reason, and the Unifying Principle Underlying Antitrust Rules, 73 ANTITRUST
L.J. 435, 437 (2006).

15. See infra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
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guidance and no reliable safe harbors to business planners, and would
likely over-deter by chilling efficient business practices. 6 In its most
extreme form, eschewal of a single definition of exclusionary conduct
in favor of non-universal standards would offend basic rule-of-law
norms." The more modest non-universalist approach some
commentators have advocated ultimately reduces to one of the
indeterminate and overdeterrent universal theories.' 8
In light of these deficiencies, this Article proposes an alternative
"exclusion of a competitive rival" approach that would deem conduct
unreasonably exclusionary only if it were reasonably likely to exclude
from the defendant's market a "competitive rival," defined as a rival
that is as aggressive a competitor as the defendant and would be
capable at minimum efficient scale ("MES")-the lowest production
level at which all available scale economies could be exploited--of
matching or exceeding the defendant's productive efficiency.19 Such
an approach would comport with basic intuitions about appropriate
competition, provide clear guidance and reliable safe harbors for
business planners, generate administrable liability rules for antitrust
tribunals, and maximize the net benefits of antitrust regulation by
minimizing the sum of "decision" and "error" costs.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I sets forth and critiques
the aforementioned universal definitions of exclusionary conduct as
well as the argument in favor of non-universal standards. Part II then
describes my alternative "exclusion of a competitive rival" approach
and shows how it may be operationalized in different contexts.
Finally, Part III anticipates and responds to concerns that the
proposed approach would be underdeterrent and could facilitate
collusion.
I. PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED DEFINITIONS OF UNREASONABLY
EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT

A.

Exclusion of an Equally Efficient Rival

In the second edition of his Antitrust Law book, Judge Posner
defined unreasonably exclusionary conduct as behavior that is "likely
in the circumstances to exclude from the defendant's market an
16. See infra notes 44-45, 56-68, 88-92 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 103-10 and accompanying text.
19. Minimum efficient scale is the lowest production point at which long-run average
total costs are minimized. See HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS 428
(1987).
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equally or more efficient competitor." 20 Such a definition seemingly
accords with common notions of vigorous but fair competition. A
"competitive" race, for example, is one in which each runner does all
she can to get ahead, and the fastest runner wins. While conduct that
would permit victory by a runner other than the fastest is, quite
literally, anti-competitive, any conduct that would push a runner
ahead, though not ahead of her faster or equally fast rivals, makes the
race better (i.e., improves the average speed of the runners) and is
expected. An "equally efficient rival" test thus encourages firms to do
all they can to win business for themselves, except for any actions that
might reduce long-run market output by driving out more capable
competitors. Consistent with the oft-repeated adage that antitrust
exists "for the protection of competition, not competitors,"2 1 the
equally efficient rival definition ultimately focuses on protecting the
overall system for maximizing market output rather than on
preserving undeserving participants within the system.
Posner's intuition has found some traction in Section 2 case law.
Lower courts confronting the relatively novel issue of how to evaluate
bundled discounts,2 2 for example, have sought to frame liability rules
in a manner that would permit all discounts except those that could

20. POSNER, supranote 10, at 194-95.
21. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767 n.14 (1984)
(quoting Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477,488 (1977)).
22. A bundled discount occurs when a firm sells a collection of goods from different
product markets for a lower price than the aggregate price for which it would sell the
constituent goods individually. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND
MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT 91
(2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/reports/236681.pdf [hereinafter Bush
DOJ Single-Firm Conduct Report]. The Justice Department under President Obama
withdrew this report. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department
Withdraws Report on Antitrust Monopoly Law (May 11, 2009), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/pressreleases/2009/245710.pdf. Courts are currently split
on the appropriate rule for evaluating the legality of such discounts. Compare, e.g.,
LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 152 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (positing broad liability
rule), with Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 906 (9th Cir. 2008)
(positing narrow liability rule with safe harbors), and Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc. v. Abbott
Labs., Inc., 920 F. Supp. 455, 469-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (positing even narrower liability
rule). Commentators are also split. Compare, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled
Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397,
399-403 (2009) (advocating broad liability rule with no price-cost safe harbor), with Daniel
A. Crane, Mixed Bundling, Profit Sacrifice, and Consumer Welfare, 55 EMORY L.J. 423,
47475 (2006) (advocating narrow liability rule with safe harbor), Herbert Hovenkamp,
Discounts and Exclusion, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 841, 850-54 (advocating narrow liability rule
with safe harbor), and Thomas A. Lambert, Evaluating Bundled Discounts, 89 MINN. L.
REV. 1688, 1742-53 (2005) (advocating narrower liability rule with safe harbor).
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exclude an equally efficient rival. 23 The prevailing liability rule on
predatory pricing is similar. Under the Supreme Court's decision in
Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp,24 there
can be no liability if the defendant's price exceeds its incremental
cost.25 Given that an equally efficient rival (i.e., one facing the same
incremental cost as the defendant) could match any price above that
level, the rule effectively makes the ability to exclude an equally
efficient rival a necessary condition for liability.26
Despite the equally efficient rival test's theoretical appeal and
apparent influence on the Section 2 case law, the test has drawn
criticism, and few commentators have embraced it as a generally
applicable definition of exclusionary conduct.27 First, some have
argued that the test could permit instances of naked exclusion, which
is "conduct unabashedly meant to exclude rivals, for which no one
offers any efficiency justification." 28 Herbert Hovenkamp, for
example, offers the example of a fraudulent patent suit that is
meritless but would be costly to defend.29 Suppose that a rival as
efficient as the plaintiff could afford to defend against the lawsuit, but
23. The district court in Ortho Diagnostic, for example, began with the question of
"whether a firm that enjoys a monopoly on one or more of a group of complementary
products, but which faces competition on others, can price all of its products above
average variable cost and yet still drive an equally efficient competitor out of the market."
Ortho Diagnostic, 920 F. Supp. at 467. Answering that question in the affirmative, it
proceeded to propose a liability rule aimed at preventing exclusion of equally efficient
rivals. Id. at 469-70. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit's safe harbor for bundled discounts that
result in above-cost pricing under the "discount attribution" test expressly aims to permit
all bundled discounts that could not exclude an equally efficient rival. See Cascade Health
Solutions, 515 F.3d at 906 (observing that selected liability rule "makes the defendant's
bundled discounts legal unless the discounts have the potential to exclude a hypothetical
equally efficient producer of the competitive product" (emphasis omitted)).
24. 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
25. Id. at 222 ("First, a plaintiff seeking to establish competitive injury resulting from
a rival's low prices must prove that the prices complained of are below an appropriate
measure of its rival's costs.").
26. Cf Ortho Diagnostic, 920 F. Supp. at 466 (observing that "[tjhe reason [for
Brooke Group's below-cost pricing requirement] is plain: below-cost pricing, unlike
pricing at or above that level, carries with it the threat that the party so engaged will drive
equally efficient competitors out of business, thus setting the stage for recoupment at the
expense of consumers").
27. I am one of the few antitrust commentators to offer a defense of the equally
efficient rival test. See Thomas A. Lambert, Weyerhaeuser and the Search for Antitrust's
Holy Grail, 2006-07 CATO SUP. Cr. REV. 277 (arguing that Supreme Court's 2007
Weyerhaeuserdecision implicitly embraced the test and lauding that development).
28. Eric B. Rasmusen, J. Mark Ramseyer & John S. Wiley, Jr., Naked Exclusion, 81
AM. ECON. REV. 1137,1137 (1991).
29. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusion and the Sherman Act, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 147,
154 (2005).
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a less efficient upstart rival could not and might thus be driven out of
business by the meritless action. Surely filing the lawsuit constitutes
"unreasonably exclusionary conduct" despite the fact that it would
exclude only less efficient rivals.30
While that may be the case, the equally efficient rival definition's
failure to capture some instances of naked exclusion does not
undermine the approach in any context in which it might actually be
utilized. A definition of, or test for identifying, unreasonably
exclusionary conduct is needed only for evaluating "mixed bag"
practices that create some efficiencies but also threaten to enhance
market power. Because naked exclusion generates no efficiencies and
may be easily condemned without reference to any test for
unreasonably exclusionary conduct, the fact that the equally efficient
rival test fails to capture instances of naked exclusion is, from a
practical standpoint, unimportant.3 1
Two additional criticisms of the equally efficient rival approach,
however, may be genuinely troubling. First, the approach appears to
be under-inclusive in that it would acquit practices that prevent rivals
from attaining equivalent efficiencies.32 Conduct that impedes a rival
firm's sales opportunities-for example, a dominant manufacturer's
execution of exclusive dealing contracts with retailers collectively
comprising a large percentage of available marketing outlets-may
prevent the rival from achieving MES and thereby cause it to be less
efficient than the perpetrator. Such conduct would reduce market
output and consumer welfare, but as long as it merely prevented the
perpetrator's rivals from attaining equivalent efficiencies, it would
pass muster under the equally efficient rival approach.

30. See id.
31. Cf Melamed, supra note 13, at 399 (observing that "conduct [that] has no
efficiency properties and serves only to harm rivals ... can be readily condemned without
application of either a balancing test or a sacrifice test," for such conduct "does not raise
the issue at which these tests are directed: what to do about conduct that both has
efficiency benefits and excludes rivals").
32. See, e.g., Lao, supra note 14, at 447 ("[E]xclusionary practices are often designed
specifically to prevent a challenger from gaining scale efficiencies."); Melamed, supra note
13, at 388 ("[A] rival that is less efficient today might become equally or more efficient if
permitted time to develop learning-by-doing economies or if its sales grew and enabled it
to gain scale economies.").
33. See, e.g., EINER ELHAUGE, THE EXCLUSION OF COMPETITION FOR HOSPITAL
SALES THROUGH GROUP PURCHASING ORGANIZATIONS 24 n.68, 33-34 (2002), available
at http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/elhauge/pdf/gpo-reportjune-02.pdf (arguing that it
is not sufficient to ask whether a bundled discount could exclude an equally efficient
competitor, for such discounts may be used to prevent rivals from growing and thereby
attaining scale efficiencies).
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Critics also complain that the equally efficient rival approach
would allow for the exclusion of rivals that are less efficient than the
perpetrator but nevertheless constrain its market power and are the
only competitors likely to arrive on the scene.' Suppose, for example,
that a dominant firm incurs incremental costs of $10 per unit and
would, as a monopolist, charge a profit-maximizing price of $20. The
existence of a rival with costs of $13 per unit would benefit
consumers, for if that rival were to charge, say, $15, then the
dominant firm would have to lower its price or improve its quality."
Because the equally efficient rival definition protects only equally or
more efficient rivals from exclusion, detractors maintain that it could
reduce consumer welfare.
B.

Raising Rivals' Costs Unjustifiably

A second proposed definition of unreasonably exclusionary
conduct would reach substantially further than the equally efficient
rival approach. This definition stems from the insights of so-called
"Post-Chicago" theorists who, in the last few decades, have
responded to purported Chicago School claims by setting forth
complex models that demonstrate how various business practices may
occasion anticompetitive harm. 6 In particular, such scholars have
34. See Hovenkamp, supra note 29, at 154 (noting that equally efficient rival test "can
underdeter in situations where the rival that is most likely to emerge is less efficient than
the dominant firm"); Lao, supra note 14, at 447 ("The existence, or even the potential
entry, of a less efficient rival can, in fact, constrain a monopolist, thereby benefiting
consumers, and its exclusion would harm consumer welfare."); Steven C. Salop,
Exclusionary Conduct, Effect on Consumers, and the Flawed Profit-SacrificeStandard, 73
ANTITRUST L.J. 311, 328-29 (2006) (noting that "unencumbered (potential) entry of lessefficient competitors often raises consumer welfare").
35. See Lao, supra note 14, at 447; Salop, supra note 34, at 328-29 (offering a similar
example).
36. Much Post-Chicago scholarship has been in response to a somewhat caricatured
version of Chicago School antitrust analysis. Confronting a body of highly restrictive and
interventionist antitrust rules, antitrust scholars associated with the University of Chicago
demonstrated in the mid-twentieth century that many theretofore condemned business
practices would, in practice, rarely occasion anticompetitive results and were likely
adopted for procompetitive reasons. See, e.g., Robert Bork, Vertical Integration and the
Sherman Act: The Legal History of an Economic Misconception, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 157,
198-201 (1954); Ward S. Bowman, Jr., The Prerequisites and Effects of Resale Price
Maintenance, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 825, 855-58 (1955); Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying
Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19, 19-20 (1957); Aaron Director
& Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 Nw. U. L. REV. 281, 282
(1956); John S. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. &
ECON. 137, 137-38 (1958); Lester G. Telser, Why Should ManufacturersWant Fair Trade?,
3 J.L. & ECON. 86, 88 (1960). Later Chicago-affiliated scholars relied on these works to
argue, as a legal matter, that certain practices should be' legal per se. See, e.g., ROBERT H.
BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 375-81 (1978) (arguing for rule of per se legality for
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endeavored to explain how dominant firms may use contracts,
product innovations, and other means to impose disproportionately
higher costs on their rivals.37 By imposing such costs, a dominant firm
may render its rivals less efficient and thus less able to check its
higher prices, even if it fails to exclude those rivals altogether.
Accordingly, a number of scholars have suggested that conduct be
deemed unreasonably exclusionary if it raises rivals' costs without
adequate justification.38 And their proposed approach has found some
traction in the case law, primarily in exclusive dealing and tying cases,
in which courts have emphasized that the competitive harm is that the
conduct at issue may foreclose rivals to a point where their
production falls below MES.3 9
tying arrangements) [hereinafter BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX]; id. at 406
("[Antitrust law] should abandon its concern with such beneficial practices as small
horizontal mergers, all vertical and conglomerate mergers, vertical price maintenance and
market division, tying arrangements, exclusive dealing and requirements contracts,
'predatory' price-cutting, price 'discrimination,' and the like."); RICHARD A. POSNER,
ANTITRUST LAW 212 (1976) ("I would like to see the antitrust laws other than Section 1
of the Sherman Act repealed."); Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust
Treatment of Restricted Distribution:Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 23-26 (1981)
(advocating rule of per se legality for vertical price and non-price restraints, including
resale price maintenance). These later, broad statements concerning antitrust law led
some scholars to characterize the Chicago School as concluding that vertical and unilateral
practices can "never" be anticompetitive. See, e.g., How THE CHICAGO SCHOOL
OVERSHOT THE MARK 7 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008). Among these scholars are so-called
"Post-Chicago" theorists who have posited models demonstrating how, in certain narrow
circumstances, various controversial practices may occasion genuine anticompetitive harm.
See, e.g., Elhauge supra note 22, at 399-403 (demonstrating how tying, despite the Chicago
School's single monopoly profit theory, may injure consumers under certain
circumstances). In fact, Chicago School scholars recognized many of the possible harms
these scholars purport to identify. See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Timothy J. Muris, Chicago,
Post-Chicago, and Beyond: Time to Let Go of the 20th Century, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 147,
148 (2012) (demonstrating that "economists, lawyers, and judges associated with the
Chicago School anticipated many of the 'new' insights credited to the Post-Chicago
School"); Thomas A. Lambert, Appropriate Liability Rules for Tying and Bundled
Discounting,72 OHIO ST. L.J. 909, 924 n.78 (2011) (showing that Chicago School scholars
had acknowledged the potential adverse tying effects Elhauge identified).
37. See Hovenkamp, supra note 29, at 159-60. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp,
Post-ChicagoAntitrust: A Review and Critique,2001 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 257 (exploring
the successes and failures of the Post-Chicago school).
38. See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 7, at 256, 330; Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 11,
at 214; Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals' Costs, 73 AM. ECON. REV.
267 (1983).
39. See, e.g., NicSand, Inc. v. 3M Co., 457 F.3d 534, 543 (6th Cir. 2006), vacated and
reheard en banc, 507 F.3d 442 (6th Cir. 2007) ("Monopolization through exclusive dealing
is unlawful because it enables a party to attain that position of dominance not by offering
'a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident,' but by raising its rivals'
distribution costs by eliminating their access to downstream markets." (internal citation
omitted)); Hovenkamp, supra note 29, at 159-60 n.45 (citing cases embracing raising
rivals' costs theory of anticompetitive harm).
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It is crucial, of course, that any "raising rivals' costs" ("RRC")
approach require that the cost-raising be unjustifiable. Given that
consumer-friendly, efficient conduct often has the effect of winning
business from rivals and may thereby reduce their scale and increase
their per-unit cost of production,4 0 an RRC definition of exclusionary
conduct must posit some means of determining when cost-raising
conduct is unjustifiable if it is to represent an improvement on the
vacuous verbal formulations sprinkled throughout the case law.4 1 The
leading attempt to do so defines "justifiable" increases of rivals' costs
as those that result as a byproduct of the defendant's enhanced
efficiency.42 If a firm's conduct raises rivals' costs because it makes the
firm more efficient, the cost-raising is justifiable. If the conduct raises
rivals' costs without enhancing the perpetrator's efficiency, the costraising is unjustifiable.4 3
While it sounds simple enough, this approach imposes a difficult
burden on adjudicators and provides little guidance-and no safe
harbors-to business planners contemplating actions likely to win
business from rivals. Consider, for example, a firm that offered a 12%
loyalty discount to customers purchasing at least 70% of their
requirements from the firm." Suppose that a rival firm complained

40. Building a better mousetrap, for example, may allow the builder to usurp so much
business from its rival mousetrap producers that they fall below MES. Cf Frank H.
Easterbrook, When Is It Worthwhile to Use Courts to Search for Exclusionary Conduct?,
2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 345, 346-47 ("Raising rivals' costs can be mistaken for any
other element of doing business. General Motors does not sell engines to Ford, and this
may raise Ford's costs; but the separation also is essential to rivalry .... ").
41. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text (discussing vacuous judicial definitions
of unreasonably exclusionary conduct).
42. See Elhauge, supra note 7, at 256 ("The key is that [justifiable cost-raising]
conduct can successfully impair rival efficiency only as a byproduct of the defendant
improving its own efficiency, which enhances the market options available to
consumers.").
43. Elhauge maintains that antitrust should eschew "an open-ended rule of reason
balancing test" for determining when cost-raising conduct is justifiable and should instead:
employ[] two rules to sort out when to condemn conduct that helps acquire or
maintain monopoly power. One rule makes such conduct per se legal if its
exclusionary effect on rivals depends on enhancing the defendant's efficiency. The
other rule makes such conduct per se illegal if its exclusionary effect on rivals will
enhance monopoly power regardless of any improvement in defendant efficiency.
Id. at 330.
44. A loyalty discount occurs when a seller discounts (or provides a price rebate on)
all units of a single product if a buyer makes a certain level of purchases. Sometimes called
"all-units" or "first-dollar" discounts, loyalty discounts apply to all of the customer's
purchases, rather than just the units beyond the level of purchases required to qualify for
the discount. See Bush DOJ Single-Firm Conduct Report, supra note 22, at 106. The
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that this structured discount usurped so much of its business that it
fell below MES and consequently incurred higher per-unit costs. To
determine whether that cost-raising was justifiable, a factfinder would
have to decide whether it was a byproduct of enhancing the
discounter's efficiency.
Imagine that the defendant demonstrated that it was running its
factories at 70% capacity prior to offering the discount and that the
discount increased sales so that the factories were run at 90%
capacity, creating apparent economies of scale. If the complaining
rival could show (1) that all efficiencies could be exploited at 80%
capacity (because, say, incremental scale economies above that level
were small and were offset by diseconomies occasioned by increased
wear and tear) and (2) that an 8% loyalty rebate would have driven
production to 80% capacity, then the "excessive" loyalty discount
(the additional four percentage points) would appear unjustifiable.
That is, it would raise rivals' costs "regardless of any improvement in
defendant efficiency."45 Of course, determining with confidence what
level of production achieves MES is difficult, and ascertaining what
size discount will achieve that level of production is nigh-untoimpossible. But those are precisely the tasks factfinders would have to
undertake under the RRC approach. Arbitrary verdicts, and the
chilling effect they precipitate, would inevitably result.
C.

Consumer Welfare Effects Balancing
Whereas the equally efficient rival and RRC approaches define
unreasonably exclusionary conduct in reference to the conduct's
effect on actual or potential rivals, a third set of approaches
deemphasizes effects on rivals and focuses directly on the net effect
the conduct at issue has on consumer welfare. The most prominent
consumer welfare-balancing test appears in the Areeda-Hovenkamp
antitrust treatise, which defines unreasonably exclusionary conduct as
acts that
(1) are reasonably capable of creating, enlarging or prolonging
monopoly power by impairing the opportunities of rivals; and

competitive risks presented by loyalty discounts are discussed in greater detail below. See
infra notes 167-70 and accompanying text.
45. Elhauge, supra note 7, at 330; see also id. at 324 (condemning the portion of a
hypothetical agreement that expanded a monopolist's market share beyond the level
needed to attain MES because it "provided no incremental increase in the monopolist's
efficiency").
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(2) that either (2a) do not benefit consumers at all, or (2b) are
unnecessary for the particular consumer benefits that the acts
produce, or (2c) produce harms disproportionate to any
resulting benefits.4 6
In practice, this seemingly complicated definition simply posits
an effects-balancing test. The first element (Part (1)) is useful only for
immunizing conduct that could have no adverse effect on rivals and
should obviously pass muster. Parts (2a) and (2b), then, address easy
cases of harm without benefit. Because a generalized definition of
exclusionary conduct is needed only for evaluating mixed bag conduct
exhibiting both procompetitive and anticompetitive effects-conduct
that would satisfy element 1 but neither (2a) nor (2b)-the focus in
any case in which the Areeda-Hovenkamp definition is actually
helpful will be on Part (2c): a balancing of the challenged conduct's
harms and benefits.47
In its now-abrogated report on Section 2 of the Sherman Act, the
DOJ under George W. Bush endorsed this sort of effects-balancing
approach for evaluating mixed bag conduct, though it was careful to
emphasize that a practice should be deemed unreasonably
exclusionary only if "its likely anticompetitive harms substantially
outweigh its likely procompetitive benefits." 48 The DOJ asserted that
exclusionary conduct producing only slightly greater anticompetitive
harms than procompetitive benefits should not be deemed
unreasonably exclusionary lest the law chill procompetitive but novel
business practices. 49 That caveat, of course, raises the question of how
disproportionate the balance of harms to benefits must be before the
line of "unreasonableness" is crossed.o
Like both the equally efficient rival and RRC tests,"' the
consumer welfare-balancing approach has achieved some traction in
case law. Most notably, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
46. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, 651a at 96.
47. See Melamed, supra note 13, at 380 (explaining why the Areeda-Hovenkamp test
requires balancing in all cases in which a generalized test for exclusionary conduct would
be helpful).
48. Bush DOJ Single-Firm Conduct Report, supra note 22, at 45 (emphasis added).
49. See id. (observing that the "disproportionality" test would "allow[] firms the
freedom to compete vigorously without undue fear of antitrust liability based on an afterthe-fact determination that their conduct had small negative effects on static
competition").
50. See id. (acknowledging that "disproportionality 'is hardly an inherently certain
formula'" (quoting Andrew I. Gavil, Exclusionary Distribution Strategies by Dominant
Firms:Striking a Better Balance, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 3, 64 (2004))).
51. See supra notes 22-26, 39 and accompanying text (discussing influence of the
equally efficient test and the RRC approach on Section 2 case law).
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Circuit purported to follow such an approach in United States v.
Microsoft Corp.,52 in which it assigned burdens to the parties as
follows:
[T]he plaintiff, on whom the burden of proof of course rests,
must [first] demonstrate that the monopolist's conduct indeed
has the requisite anticompetitive effect....
[I]f a plaintiff successfully establishes a prima facie case under
§2 by demonstrating anticompetitive effect, then the
monopolist [defendant] may proffer a "procompetitive
justification" for its conduct. If the monopolist asserts a
procompetitive justification-a nonpretextual claim that its
conduct is indeed a form of competition on the merits because
it involves, for example, greater efficiency or enhanced
consumer appeal-then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff
to rebut that claim....
[I]f the monopolist's procompetitive justification stands
unrebutted, then the plaintiff must demonstrate that the
anticompetitive harm of the conduct outweighs the
procompetitive benefit.53
Although this burden-shifting regime officially called for the
unreasonableness of exclusionary conduct to be determined on the
basis of its net effect on consumer welfare,54 the actual analysis in
Microsoft involved little effects balancing.
52. 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
53. Id. at 58-59 (citations omitted).
54. Professor Hovenkamp has observed that the Microsoft court's definition of
unreasonably exclusionary conduct was "roughly similar to the definition given in
Antitrust Law." Hovenkamp, supra note 29, at 153.
55. As Mark Popofsky has observed,
The [Microsoft] court actually compared effects only when analyzing Microsoft's
restrictions on computer manufacturers' modifications of the Windows start-up
screens. This conduct, which impeded rivals but the court found justified by
substantial efficiencies, involved agreements also subject to Sherman Act Section
1's rule of reason. By contrast, when analyzing Microsoft's unilateral "product
design" conduct ... the court, while using the language of comparing effects, in
fact avoided that inquiry. Rather than compare effects, the court found in some
instances no anticompetitive effect, in some no justification, and in others no
rebuttal to the justification....
Revealingly, the Microsoft court also appeared to protect certain conduct as
essentially per se lawful.... In other words, the court determined that impeding
rivals through conduct deemed to reflect only efficiency was, in effect, protected
"superior skill, foresight, and industry."
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Despite drawing praise from leading treatise authors and the
DOJ, and at least lip service from the D.C. Circuit, consumer welfarebalancing is problematic as a means of assessing whether conduct is
unreasonably exclusionary. For one thing, recent Supreme Court
precedents appear to be inconsistent with an effects-balancing
approach. In a number of key Section 2 decisions-including the
Brooke Group decision setting forth predatory pricing standards, 6
the Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber, Co.,

LLP 7 decision on predatory over-bidding,"

and the Verizon

Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP5 9

decision on a monopolist's antitrust duty to share facilities with its
rivals60-the Court crafted liability rules that concededly could permit
net consumer harm. In each case, the Court reasoned that conduct
should be permitted even in instances in which net consumer welfare
might be reduced because the potential harm at issue was "beyond
the practical ability of a judicial tribunal to control."6 1 A narrow focus
on consumer welfare-balancing alone, then, cannot explain existing
liability rules.
As a policy matter, using welfare-balancing to assess whether
exclusionary conduct is unreasonable is problematic because the
required inquiry is too difficult for courts to conduct and provides
business planners with little guidance and no reliable safe harbors.
Consider, for example, the Herculean task confronting a court
assessing a recently implemented loyalty rebate that could end up
winning so much business for the discounter that one of its key rivals
falls below MES.62 To determine whether such a rebate is
unreasonably exclusionary, the evaluating court would have to:
Popofsky, supra note 14, at 445-47.
56. Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222-23
(1993) (holding that plaintiffs complaining of price predation must allege and prove
pricing "below an appropriate measure of .. . costs," even though net consumer harm may
result even absent below-cost pricing).
57. 549 U.S. 312 (2007).
58. Id. at 325 (holding that bidding up the price of an input cannot create liability
unless the bidding drives the defendant's output price below cost, even though net
consumer harm could result from less aggressive bidding for inputs).
59. 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
60. Id. at 411 (2004) (refusing to impose a general duty to share productive facilities
with rivals even though such non-sharing may result in monopoly pricing and impose net
consumer harm).
61. Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 223; see Weyerhaeuser, 549 U.S. at 325 (quoting Brooke
Grp., 509 U.S. at 223); Trinko, 540 U.S. at 414 (quoting Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 223).
62. This was the Federal Trade Commission's theory of liability in its recent
(ultimately settled) action against Intel Corporation under Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act. As then-professor (now FTC Commissioner) Joshua Wright explained,
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(1) estimate immediate consumer benefit by comparing output
and price levels with the rebate in place to what would have
persisted absent the rebate; 63
(2) estimate expected future harm by (2a) assessing the
probability that the rebate will drive the discounter's rival
below MES, (2b) estimating the degree to which future
consumer welfare will be lower (because of reduced output and
higher prices) if the rival is driven from the market or continues
in business but raises its prices to account for its higher costs,
(2c) multiplying the probability of a consumer welfare loss
(determined in (2a)) by the estimated magnitude of welfare
reduction (determined in (2b)), and (2d) discounting to present
value any future expected welfare loss (determined in (2c)); and
(3) compare immediate consumer benefit (determined in step
1) to the present value of expected consumer harm (determined
in step (2d)).
Because some version of this complicated analysis would be required
for evaluating virtually all mixed bag conduct"-the only conduct for
which a generalized definition of exclusionary conduct is helpful-the
consumer welfare-balancing approach would tax courts and strain the
capacities of jurors.'

The Commission's anticompetitive theory [was] that Intel's loyalty discounts
provide original equipment manufacturers ("OEMs") with an incentive to
purchase almost all of their microprocessor and graphics processor units ("CPUs",
"GPUs") from Intel. Accordingly, Intel's rivals lose sales, and are unable to
achieve minimum efficient scale to compete effectively with Intel. After these
rivals--chief among them AMD [Advanced Micro Devices]-are excluded, Intel is
free to raise prices to recoup profits lost by the original discounts.
Joshua D. Wright, An Antitrust Analysis of the Federal Trade Commission's Complaint
Against Intel, in ICLE ANTITRUST AND COMPETITION POLICY WHITE PAPER SERIES 1, 1
(2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1624943.
63. Market output is of course merely a proxy for consumer benefit. In some
circumstances, such as when there is rampant price discrimination that increases output
but transfers surplus from consumers to producers, market output may poorly reflect
consumer surplus. Because accurately assessing consumer benefit would require access to
consumers' individual reservation prices, however, market output is generally the best
surrogate.
64. The required analysis would be particularly difficult for conduct involving
"degrees." See infra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
65. Antitrust issues are notoriously difficult for jurors. Consider, for example, Arthur
Austin's account of his post-trial interviews with the Brooke Group jurors. Professor
Austin concluded that "the jurors were overwhelmed, frustrated, and confused by
testimony well beyond their comprehension" and that "at no time did any juror graspeven at the margins-the law, the economics, or any other testimony relating to the
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More importantly, widespread adoption of the consumer
welfare-balancing approach would create tremendous uncertainty for
business planners and thereby chill innovation.' The business planner
must not simply estimate benefits and compare them to expected
harms, a formidable enough task; she must instead predict how a
future judge or jury evaluating matters in hindsight will assess the net

consumer benefits of the contemplated innovation. If the business
planner makes a mistake, either in her estimation of net benefits or
her assessment of how a future court will view matters, her firm may
suffer an adverse treble damages verdict.6' A consumer welfarebalancing approach is thus likely to deter many efficiency-enhancing,
but novel, business practices.6 8
D. Sacrifice-Based Tests
The aforementioned approaches all purport to define
unreasonably exclusionary conduct-that is, to specify the essence of
allegations or defense." Arthur Austin, The Jury System at Risk from Complexity, the New
Media, and Deviancy, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 51, 54 (1995).
66. As Douglas Melamed has observed,
The [consumer welfare-]balancing test would require a firm to determine, before it
embraces new competitive strategies, not just the impact of the strategies on its
business, but also the impact on rivals and to weigh the benefits to its consumers
against the long-run harm to consumers if the firm's less-inventive rivals are
weakened or driven from the market as a result. Assessing the long-run harm
would require, among other things, calculating the duration of the harm in light of
responses by competitors, new entry, and future innovation.
Melamed, supranote 13, at 381.
67. As Professor Elhauge has observed, when indeterminate monopolization
standards are employed,
firms must operate under the risk that the actual criteria by which their conduct
will be judged will depend largely on the happenstance of which judge and jurors
will be selected in a trial a great number of years later that will retroactively decide
whether to assess multimillion or even multibillion dollar treble damages. Further,
firms run the risk that different judges or juries will reach inconsistent conclusions
about the legality of their conduct based on different implicit normative criteria.
These sorts of risks cannot help but chill investments to create product offerings
with a sufficient quality or cost advantage over preexisting market options to enjoy
monopoly power.
Elhauge, supranote 7, at 266--67.
68. Tweaking the consumer welfare-balancing test so that it finds unreasonableness
only where expected consumer harms "substantially outweigh" consumer benefits, as the
Bush DOJ proposed, see supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text, hardly solves the
problem here. While such a tactic could enhance judicial administrability and alleviate
some uncertainty for planners by requiring less precision in measuring likely effects, it
adds another source of uncertainty by incorporating yet another unknown variable: the
degree by which harms must exceed benefits in order to "substantially outweigh" them.
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"unreasonable exclusionariness." 69 A fourth set of approaches, by
contrast, abandons the quest for the Platonic essence of unreasonable
exclusionariness and instead seeks merely to identify unreasonably
exclusionary conduct without specifying what it is about the conduct
that makes it so.70
Early versions of this identifying approach held that conduct is
unreasonably exclusionary if it involves a sacrifice of immediate
profits as part of a strategy whose profitability depends on the
exclusion of rivals.71 Advocates emphasized the administrability of
this so-called "profit-sacrifice test," which requires courts (or business
planners) to determine only whether challenged (or contemplated)
conduct is profit-enhancing apart from the market power it generates.
Like the three foregoing approaches, the profit sacrifice test has
enjoyed some apparent support in the Section 2 case law.7 2 In Aspen
Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.,73 for example, the
Supreme Court upheld a jury's finding that the owner of three ski
resorts had engaged in unreasonably exclusionary conduct when it
ceased participating in a profitable joint venture with a competing ski
resort and went so far as to refuse to sell lift tickets to that rival at
retail prices that would have generated a profit.74 The Court
explained,
The refusal to accept [plaintiff's] Adventure Pack coupons in
exchange for daily tickets was apparently motivated entirely by
a decision to avoid providing any benefit to [plaintiff] even
69. According to those approaches, that essence consists of having the potential to
exclude an equally efficient rival, see supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text, or raising
rivals' costs without justification, see supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text, or
impairing rivals' opportunities to the point at which market power would be created and
net consumer welfare reduced, see supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
70. See Werden, supra note 13, at 418 (observing that "the no economic sense test
provides only a tool for identifying exclusionary conduct").
71. See, e.g., BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 36, at 144 (defining
predation as "a firm's deliberate aggression against one or more rivals through the
employment of business practices that would not be considered profit maximizing except
for the expectation either that (1) rivals will be driven from the market, leaving the
predator with a market share sufficient to command monopoly profits, or (2) rivals will be
chastened sufficiently to abandon competitive behavior the predator finds inconvenient or
threatening"); Ordover & Willig, supra note 13, at 9 ("Assuming that businessmen know
how their actions affect their profitability and the profitability of their rivals, predatory
objectives are present if a practice would be unprofitable without the exit it causes, but
profitable with the exit. Thus, although a practice may cause a rival's exit, it is predatory
only if the practice would not be profitable without the additional monopoly power
resulting from the exit.").
72. See infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
73. 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
74. Id. at 610-11.
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though accepting the coupons would have entailed no cost to
[the defendant] itself, would have provided it with immediate
benefits, and would have satisfied its potential customers. Thus
the evidence supports an inference that [defendant] was not
motivated by efficiency concerns and that it was willing to
sacrifice short-run benefits and consumer goodwill in exchange
for a perceived long-run impact on its smaller rival."
Building on this reasoning, the Court in Trinko concluded that the
defendant did not owe a duty to deal with its rivals where, unlike in
Aspen Skiing, the defendant had not done so voluntarily in the past
and the refusal to deal did not "suggest[] a willingness to forsake
short-term profits to achieve an anticompetitive end.""6
Despite the intuitive appeal of the profit sacrifice test and the
judicial acceptance it has achieved, its traditional formulation is
somewhat problematic. As Professor Herbert Hovenkamp has
observed, the traditional profit sacrifice test is both over- and underinclusive." It is over-inclusive because it would condemn some
obviously procompetitive conduct, such as new product
development." Hovenkamp offers the example of a firm that spends
money developing a new mousetrap that, when ultimately sold, will
attract so many buyers that competing mousetrap makers are driven
out of business and the innovator's per-unit profit margin (the
difference between its price and marginal cost) rises.79 The firm's
conduct involves an immediate profit sacrifice leading to monopoly
pricing that compensates for the sacrifice period, but the conduct is
75. Id.
76. Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 409
(2004); see also Covad Commc'ns Co. v. Bell At. Corp., 398 F.3d 666, 676 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(refusing to dismiss claim of exclusionary conduct based on refusal to deal because facts
could show that "[defendant's] refusal to deal reflected its willingness to sacrifice
immediate profits from the sale of its DSL service in the hope of driving [plaintiff] out of
the market and recovering monopoly profits in the long-run"); MetroNet Servs. Corp. v.
Qwest Corp., 383 F.3d 1124, 1134 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding no unreasonably exclusionary
conduct where defendant's refusal to deal did not "entail a sacrifice of short-term profits
for long-term gain from the exclusion of competition"). In addition to these "refusal to
deal" cases, the Brooke Group decision on predatory pricing-at least in the second part
of its famous liability test-is consistent with a profit sacrifice approach. By requiring that
the market in which below-cost pricing occurs be one in which there is a likelihood of
recoupment, see Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209,
224 (1993), the Court acknowledged that unreasonably exclusionary price cuts are those
that sacrifice current profits in an effort to achieve supracompetitive profits upon the
attainment of market power in the future. Id. at 225-26.
77. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND
EXECUTION 152-53 (2005).
78. See id.
79. Id.
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garden-variety innovation that should hardly be condemned under
the antitrust laws." On the other hand, Hovenkamp observes, the
traditional profit sacrifice test is under-inclusive because it would
acquit various acts of monopoly maintenance, such as certain
exclusive dealing and tying arrangements, that are immediately
profitable (i.e., they require no recoupment period) but are also
anticompetitive."1
In light of these criticisms of the profit sacrifice test, most
proponents of a sacrifice-based approach to identifying unreasonably
exclusionary conduct now advocate what has been dubbed a "no
economic sense test." In an amicus brief filed in Trinko, for example,
the DOJ contended that "conduct is not exclusionary or predatory
unless it would make no economic sense for the defendant but for its
tendency to eliminate or lessen competition."8 2 Taken literally, the
DOJ was merely positing a safe harbor-i.e., saying what will not
constitute exclusionary conduct-rather than setting forth a liability
test. Presumably, though, the DOJ also meant that conduct is
unreasonably exclusionary if it makes no economic sense apart from
its tendency to eliminate or lessen competition.
So construed, the no economic sense test appears to avoid
Hovenkamp's concerns about the profit sacrifice test's over- and
under-inclusivity. The argument that the latter test is too broad
because it would condemn costly research and development in pursuit
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Brief for the United States and the FTC as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at
15, Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004)
(No. 02-682), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/05/trinkof.pdf.
83. Indeed, the DOJ has made that point clear in several lower court filings. See, e.g.,
Brief for the United States at 7, 28, United States v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181 (3d
Cir. 2005) (No. 03-4097) (public redacted version), available at http://www.justice.gov
/atr/cases/f202100/202141.pdf (contending that defendant's policies of terminating dealers
that carried rivals' products and accepting dealers only if they dropped rivals' products
"made no economic sense but for their tendency to harm rivals" because the policies cost
the defendant something yet produced no possible benefit other than reducing
competition); Brief for Appellant United States of America at 2, 30, United States v.
AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003) (No. 01-3202) (public redacted version),
availableat http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f9800/9814.pdf (asserting that defendant drove
out rivals by adding "money-losing capacity" and that "distinguishing legitimate
competition from unlawful predation requires a common-sense business inquiry: whether
the conduct would be profitable, apart from any exclusionary effects"); Brief for
Appellees United States and the State Plaintiffs at 48, United States v. Microsoft Corp.,
253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Nos. 00-5212, 00-5213), available at http://www.usdoj.gov
/atr/cases/f221300/221393.pdf (arguing that a course of conduct that served to protect the
defendant's operating system monopoly was exclusionary because it "would not make
economic sense unless it eliminated or softened competition").
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of innovation assumes that it is sufficient to ask whether the
defendant's conduct involves a short-run profit sacrifice. The no
economic sense test, however, requires more: Where there is a shortrun profit sacrifice, one must ask why it would be rational to make
that sacrifice; if there is a profit-enhancing rationale-some
"economic sense"-besides a lessening of competition, then the
liability test is not satisfied.' Advocates of the test therefore retort
that research and development expenditures, purchases of capital
equipment, and other "[o]rdinary investments in opportunities for
future profit normally are not deemed exclusionary under the [no
economic sense] test because they make economic sense apart from
any tendency to eliminate competition and because they have no such
tendency.""
As for the argument that the profit sacrifice test is too narrow
because it fails to condemn practices that are immediately profitable
but also exclusionary, advocates of the no economic sense test retort
that their version of a sacrifice-based approach does not require two
time periods-a short-run period in which losses are incurred
followed by a period of monopoly recoupment. Instead, the no
economic sense test focuses on the nature of the challenged conduct
and asks simply whether the conduct would reduce profits but for its
tendency to eliminate competition. When the conduct will be
profitable is irrelevant; the key question is instead why it is (or is
expected to be). If the answer to that question is anything other than
84. See Werden, supra note 13, at 424 ("When the defendant's conduct entails a shortrun profit sacrifice, the no economic sense test further asks why it is rational to make that
sacrifice.").
85. Id. One might quibble with this retort. Investments in innovation (R&D
expenditures, etc.) are not rational unless the investor expects to earn future economic
profits sufficient to recoup those up-front expenses. Even when an innovation investment
does not result in the elimination of rivals, it makes no economic sense unless the
innovator in the future is able to charge prices in excess of its incremental cost. Market
power is conventionally defined as the ability to charge prices in excess of marginal cost.
See Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Robert H. Lande & Steven M. Salop, Monopoly Power and
Market Power in Antitrust Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 241, 247 (1987) ("Economists use both
'market power' and 'monopoly power' to refer to the power of a single firm or group of
firms to price profitability above marginal cost."). Indeed, the Lerner Index measures
market power as (Pprofit-maximizing p - MCmagmu cosppofit-maximizing price thereby indicating that
the essence of market power is the ability to charge above-cost prices and that market
power grows the more a seller is able to increase profits by raising its price above its cost.
See generally Kenneth G. Elzinga & David E. Mills, The Lerner Index of Monopoly
Power: Origins and Uses, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 558 (2011) (discussing the history of the
Lerner Index and its uses in antitrust law). Because every innovation involving up-front
expenditures makes no economic sense absent an ability to profitably charge abovemarginal cost prices in the future, one might say that every innovation makes no economic
sense absent the attainment of future market power of some sort.
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"because of a reduction of competition," then the conduct is not
unreasonably exclusionary. The no economic sense test, therefore,
could condemn practices that, in Hovenkamp's words, "may be
profitable the instant they are in place, yet also anticompetitive." 6
Despite avoiding the primary problems afflicting the profit
sacrifice test, the no economic sense test still comes up short as a
generalized test for identifying instances of unreasonably
exclusionary conduct. The inquiry it requires-whether the conduct
at issue enhances the perpetrator's profits absent an exercise of
market power-is admittedly simpler than that involved in consumer
welfare-balancing, which requires assessment of the net effects on
myriad current and future consumers." But application of the no
economic sense test can still be difficult and its outcome
indeterminate. Assessing actual or contemplated conduct under the
test requires courts and business planners to compare the
perpetrator's expected profits without the conduct at issue to what its
profits would be with the practice if no price increases (or output
reductions) from enhanced market power resulted.8 This gets quite
complicated when the practice at issue is a mixed bag likely to result
in some efficiency enhancement and some increase in market share
and thus perhaps market power. Because the dispositive question is
whether the conduct would be profitable but for the enhancement of
market power, the party assessing the conduct would have to
(1) determine the perpetrator's cost of engaging in the conduct at
issue, (2) ascertain the incremental revenue gain the conduct is likely
to produce for the perpetrator, (3) estimate how much of that gain
would be attributable to an increase in market power, (4) subtract
that amount from the total incremental revenue gain, and
(5) compare the remaining revenue gain to the cost of engaging in the
conduct at issue. The conduct is non-exclusionary only if the revenue
increase not induced by an enhancement of market power exceeds
the cost of engaging in the conduct.
The inquiry set forth above, as complicated as it is, would be
even more difficult for most of the mixed bag business practices for
which a generally applicable exclusionary conduct test is helpful.
Most business strategies that generate some efficiencies but also have
86. HOVENKAMP, supra note 77, at 152.
87. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
88. See Salop, supra note 34, at 319 ("The profit-sacrifice test examines the
profitability of the defendant's conduct relative to a hypothetical market outcome that is
used as the non-exclusionary benchmark. The hypothetical 'but-for' marketplace is one in
which it is impossible to raise prices following the exclusionary conduct.").
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the potential to create or enhance market power do not involve only
binary, all-or-nothing practices. While a decision, say, to redesign a
product in a manner that would disadvantage rival complement
makers might involve an all-or-nothing choice, 9 most decisions that
enhance efficiency but also increase the perpetrator's market share
involve doing something "to some degree." Offering a bundled
discount to purchasers who buy both one's A and B products, for
example, requires a decision about what level of discount to offer
(5%? 8%? 12%?).90 A loyalty rebate to customers who purchase
some percentage of their requirements from the discounter requires
two decisions involving degrees: at what level of loyalty should the
rebates kick in (60% of the buyer's requirements? 70%? 80%?), and
how great should the rebate be (5%? 8%? 12%?). Exclusive dealing
agreements and requirements tie-ins involve decisions about
agreement duration (six months? one year? two years?) and the scope
of covered products (i.e., is the buyer permitted to buy very close
substitutes from your rival? how close?). When conduct involving
"degrees" is at issue, application of the no economic sense test
becomes nearly intractable, for the business planner (ex ante) and the
adjudicator (ex post) cannot simply evaluate the business practice in
its entirety. Instead, the decision-maker must engage in marginal
analysis-that is, she must decide for each increment whether it makes
economic sense but for its tendency to exclude rivals.
Consider again a firm's offer to pay a 12% loyalty rebate to
customers who buy at least 70% of their requirements from it.
Suppose that prior to implementation of the rebate scheme, the firm
was running its factories at 70% capacity and that the rebate
permitted it to expand sales so that its factories were operated at 90%
capacity, reducing the firm's per-unit costs. Even if the increased
revenues from cost reductions exceeded the total amount of loyalty
rebates paid, this rebate would not be insulated from antitrust
liability, for some increment of the rebate scheme might run afoul of
the no economic sense test. For example, first suppose that all scale
efficiencies could be exploited if the seller were to run its factories at
80% capacity (because the incremental scale economies above that
level were offset by diseconomies occasioned by increased wear and
89. See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 285 (2d Cir.
1979). Even that decision may involve "degrees"-i.e., there may be a range of redesign
options, some creating greater rival disadvantage than others.
90. Offering a bundled discount may also require decisions about how many and
which products to include in the bundle a purchaser must buy to secure the discount-e.g.,
A and B only; A, B, and C; or A, B, C, and D?
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tear). Second, suppose that the seller could have attracted enough
new business to achieve that lower level of production by either
paying only an 8% (not 12%) loyalty rebate conditioned on
purchasing 70% of requirements, or paying a 12% loyalty rebate
conditioned on purchasing only 65% (not 70%) of requirements.
Under those facts, some portion of the seller's loyalty rebate-four
percentage points of the rebate (the increment from 8% to 12%) or
five percentage points of the purchase requirement to secure the
rebate (the increment from 65% to 70%)-would be deemed
unreasonably exclusionary under the no economic sense test. Given
that a firm considering a loyalty rebate could ensure against treble
antitrust damages only by justifying each increment of its rebate
scheme, and even then could not be certain that a jury evaluating
matters ex post would find its ex ante analysis persuasive, 9' the no
economic sense test would almost certainly chill many such rebates,
as well as other efficiency enhancing but market share increasing
practices involving "degrees."' Widespread adoption of the no
economic sense test would therefore occasion large welfare losses by
imposing high administrative costs (the cost of reaching a liability
judgment) and discouraging efficient but novel business practices.
E. Non-Universal Standards
In light of the various difficulties afflicting each of the proposed
definitions of (and tests for identifying) unreasonably exclusionary
conduct, some commentators have called for abandoning the quest
for a single definition of unreasonable exclusionariness-a " 'holy
grail' that may never be precisely located" 93-and instead embracing
conduct-specific, non-universal standards. Marina Lao, for example,
contends that "the application of any single standard to all allegedly
exclusionary conduct would lead to dangers of false positives or false
91. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
92. The difficulty of assessing conduct involving degrees similarly besets the RRC and
consumer welfare-balancing approaches. Under the RRC approach, evaluating such
conduct requires determining whether each increment of the practice at issue impairs rivals
regardless of any improvement in defendant efficiency. See supra note 45 and
accompanying text. Assessing such conduct under a consumer welfare-balancing approach
requires determining whether each increment of the conduct under consideration
"produce[s consumer] harms disproportionate to any resulting [consumer] benefits."
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, l 651a at 96 (discussed supra at notes 46-47 and
accompanying text).
93. R. Hewitt Pate, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
The Common Law Approach and Improving Standards for Analyzing Single Firm
Conduct, Address Before Fordham Corporate Law Institute 8 (Oct. 23, 2003), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/202724.pdf.
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negatives (mistakenly permitting anticompetitive conduct) and would
necessarily either over-deter or under-deter."9 4 Accordingly, she
concludes, courts should "have different tests for different types of
exclusionary conduct."" Similarly, Mark Popofsky maintains that
"Section 2 is not 'one size fits all' " and that "courts properly apply
different Section 2 legal tests to different conduct." 96
There are two ways courts might embrace non-universal
standards. In the extreme, they could deny the very existence of a
unified definition of unreasonably exclusionary conduct and permit
the term to mean different things in different contexts. Alternatively,
they could simply apply different legal tests in different contexts when
seeking to identify whether unreasonably exclusionary conduct, which
does have a single meaning, exists. The former approach maintains
that there is no universal definition of unreasonably exclusionary
conduct; the latter, merely that there is no universally applicable test
for identifying such conduct. Both are troubling. The former violates
basic rule-of-law norms. The latter-at least as non-universalists have
proposed it-conceptually reduces to, and is subject to the drawbacks
associated with, one of the aforementioned understandings of
exclusionary conduct.97
The rule of law-"the supremacy of regular as opposed to
arbitrary power" 9 8-is a core commitment of the American system of
government and generally requires that legal proscriptions be
prospective, be known or knowable to those subject to them, and
exhibit characteristics of generality, equality, and certainty.99 When it
94. Lao, supra note 14, at 434.
95. Id. at 435.
96. Popofsky, supra note 14, at 437.
97. The proposed approach that denies the existence of a universal test for identifying
unreasonably exclusionary conduct but concedes that such conduct does have a universal
meaning would define such conduct in terms of consumer welfare-balancing. See infra
notes 103-04 and accompanying text. For reasons explained below, that is troubling. See
infra notes 105-09 and accompanying text. An approach that similarly eschewed a
universal test for identifying unreasonably exclusionary conduct but defined such conduct
as that which could exclude a competitive rival, by contrast, would not entail the
difficulties detailed below. Thus, the problem with current proposals to reject a universal
test for, but not a universal definition of, unreasonably exclusionary conduct is with the
universal definition proponents have advocated, namely, a version of consumer welfarebalancing. This Article does not dispute the notion that different specific liability tests may
be appropriate for different types of conduct. Rather, it contends that (1) all liability tests
should ultimately seek to identify the same adverse effect and (2) that effect is the actual
or likely exclusion of a competitive rival from the defendant's market. See infra Part II.
98. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1448 (9th ed. 2009).
99. See A.

V.

DICEY,

INTRODUCTlON TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE

CONSTITUTION 198 (8th ed. 1915) ("[Rule of law] means, in the first place, the absolute
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comes to monopolization, existing legal proscriptions stem from a
single statutory source, Section 2 of the Sherman Act," which the
Supreme Court has interpreted to require two elements for liability. 101
One of those elements is, in the words of subsequent courts and
commentators, exclusionary conduct. 10 2 Rule of law norms require
that there be a common thread running through any conduct that
would satisfy that element; otherwise, the "element" would consist of
a non-exhaustive menu of unrelated acts and would cease to be an
element. Respect for the rule of law therefore mandates a single
definition of unreasonably exclusionary conduct-i.e., some common
thread that runs through all the practices deemed to be unreasonably
exclusionary and thereby causes the exclusionary conduct element to
"mean" something.
This is not to say that the rule of law requires courts to have a
single test for identifying conduct that contains the common thread;
different types of conduct may best be evaluated (to see if they
contain the common thread) using different legal tests. But if nonuniversalists are saying merely that courts should craft different legal
tests for assessing different types of conduct, that raises the question,
"What should those different tests seek to identify?" If proponents of
non-universal standards give an answer to that question-as the rule
of law requires-then they have indeed proposed a universal
definition of unreasonable exclusionariness.
That is what Lao and Popofsky have done. They assume that
reducing net consumer welfare through the exclusion or impairment
of rivals is the essence of unreasonable exclusionariness, but they
supremacy or predominance of regular law as opposed to the influence of arbitrary power,
and excludes the existence of arbitrariness, of prerogative, or even of wide discretionary
authority on the part of the government."); FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO
SERFDOM 72 (1944) ("Stripped of all technicalities, [the rule of law] means that
government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand-rules
which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive
powers in given circumstances and to plan one's individual affairs on the basis of this
knowledge.").
100. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) ("Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize ... any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony .... ").
101. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) ("The offense of
monopoly under §2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly
power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power
as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product,
business acumen, or historic accident.").
102. See, e.g., AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, 618 at 66 ("The §2
monopolizing offense requires something more than the existence of monopoly power; the
'something more' is generally referred to as an 'exclusionary practice.' ").
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would apply disparate legal tests to determine whether different types
of conduct exhibit that characteristic."' They have thus implicitly
adopted a consumer welfare-balancing definition of exclusionary
conduct. Like so-called "rule utilitarians," they would conduct utilitybalancing at the rule level rather than on an act-by-act basis.'" But
they have implicitly embraced a universal definition of unreasonably
exclusionary conduct, namely, that which violates a rule selected to
maximize net consumer welfare.
Given that it ultimately reduces to "rule" consumer welfarebalancing, the sort of approach proposed by Lao and Popofsky is
subject to the administrative difficulties besetting consumer welfarebalancing in general. Recall that a chief problem with "act" consumer
welfare-balancing is that it is largely indeterminate and therefore
likely to deter efficiency-enhancing but novel practices. 0 The same
problems-indeterminacy and its consequent chilling effect-would
exist in spades under a rule consumer welfare-balancing approach.
Consider, for example, the predicament faced by a firm deciding, in
1995, whether to offer an above-cost bundled discount on its A and B
products.106 The firm first would have had to ascertain whether the
business practice under consideration fit within a class of conduct for
which there was an existing liability rule. Finding no well-established
rules on bundled discounts,'" the firm would have had to determine
103. See Lao, supra note 14, at 45143 (describing approach and emphasizing concern
with selecting conduct-specific tests that will maximize consumer benefit by minimizing
error costs); Popofsky, supra note 14, at 437 ("The unifying principle is that each Section 2
legal test reflects a specific expression of the same underlying 'rule of reason.' ... Section
2's rule of reason, so understood, asks: For the type of conduct at issue, which legal test
likely maximizes consumer welfare over the long run?"); id. ("[A]lthough Section 2 directs
courts to apply a single underlying principle-maximize long-term consumer welfarethat principle need not, and indeed cannot, find expression in a single operational legal
command.").
104. In ethical theory, the essential difference between "act" and "rule" utilitarianism
lies in what determines whether or not an action is the right action. Act utilitarianism
maintains that an action is right insofar as it maximizes utility; rule utilitarianism maintains
that an action is right insofar as it conforms to a rule that maximizes utility. See Brad
Hooker, Rule Consequentialism,in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Jan. 9,

2008), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism-rule/.
105. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
106. An "above-cost bundled discount" is one in which the discounted price of the
bundle still exceeds the aggregate cost of the products within the bundle. Lambert, supra
note 22, at 1691. Bundled discounts are discussed in greater detail below. See infra notes
171-74 and accompanying text.
107. Most decisions addressing how to evaluate bundled discounts (and reaching
different conclusions) appeared after 1995. See, e.g., Cascade Health Solutions v.
PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 906 (9th Cir. 2008); LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 159-63
(3d Cir. 2003) (en banc); Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc. v. Abbott Labs, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 455,
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whether its discount should be analyzed as potential predatory pricing
(since the conduct at issue involves a price cut) or perhaps tying
(since the seller would be creating an incentive for buyers of its A
product also to purchase its B product). If convinced that its
contemplated discounting was sufficiently close to a practice
governed by an established liability rule, then the firm would have
had to apply that rule to determine the legality of the behavior under
consideration.
In the likely event that the firm decided that its contemplated
conduct was too different from that covered by existing liability
rules, 0 it would have been required not simply to assess whether its
contemplated course of action would enhance net consumer
welfare-that would constitute "act" consumer welfare-balancingbut instead to (1) predict what liability rule a reviewing court would
adopt for determining the legality of the type of conduct at issue (that
is, what liability rule would be deemed to maximize net consumer
welfare) and (2) evaluate its contemplated conduct under that rule. A
wrong judgment on either of those matters would have resulted in a
treble damages judgment, and the firm may well have given up on its
plan to offer its bundled discount. To the extent that the
contemplated discount would have been efficiency-enhancing, the
rule welfare-balancing approach would have created social losses in
the form of foregone efficiencies.
In addition to such uncertainty-fueled welfare losses, the sort of
approach advocated by Lao and Popofsky would generate significant
administrative costs. Applying different liability rules to different
types of behavior encourages wasteful "pigeonholing"-i.e., inquiries
by adjudicators into the appropriate category for challenged practices
and efforts by business planners to make cosmetic changes to their
practices so that they are deemed to fall within categories receiving
more favorable legal treatment.109 Antitrust case law is replete with
469 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). The only significant reported precedent on bundled discounts prior
to 1995 did not announce a generally applicable evaluative approach. See SmithKline
Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 575 F.2d 1056, 1065 (3d Cir. 1978) (basing the conclusion on the
fact-specific policies Eli Lilly instituted).
108. The contemplated bundled discount would differ from predatory pricing governed
by Brooke Group in that it would (1) be conditional upon meeting some purchase target,
(2) cover multiple products, and (3) result in an above-cost price (at least, as measured
against the aggregate cost of the bundle). See infra notes 135-36 and accompanying text. It
would differ from tying in that buyers could purchase the products separately, though
doing so would cost them the discount.
109. See generally CHARLES J. GOETz, FRED S. MCCHESNEY & THOMAS A.
LAMBERT, ANTITRUST LAW: INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION 71 (5th ed. 2013)

(discussing "the art of 'pigeonholing' in antitrust").
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disagreements among adjudicators about how business practices
should be characterized and thus evaluated."o To the extent Section 2
analysis turns on categorizing practices and does not allow for a
categorization judgment to be overridden by reference to some
overarching principle, courts and litigants will waste significant
resources in ex post fights over categorization, and business planners
will squander resources on ex ante efforts to ensure a favorable
categorization regardless of actual competitive effect. Accordingly,
the administrative costs of rule consumer welfare-balancing-like the
efficiency losses stemming from the high risk of improper liability
judgments under the approach-would be large.
II. AN ALTERNATIVE DEFINITION
A.

Criteriafor Selecting a Definition of UnreasonablyExclusionary
Conduct

The foregoing consideration of deficiencies in previously
proposed definitions of exclusionary conduct suggests features that an
optimal definition would possess. First, it would identify a common
thread that ties together all instances of unreasonably exclusionary
conduct and comports with widely accepted intuitions about what
constitutes improper competitive conduct."' In addition, the
definition would be easily administrable by adjudicators and business
planners or would at least generate conduct-specific legal tests that
are easy to administer." 2 It would strive to minimize allocative
inefficiencies-the result of market power-by avoiding improper
110. Compare, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2,18-25 (1984)
(construing hospital's exclusive relationship with anesthesiologists as imposing a tie-in
subject to quasi per se rule), with id. at 44-45 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (construing same
arrangement as exclusive dealing subject to rule of reason). For another example, compare
Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 47-49 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding that
franchisor's requirement that franchisee purchase materials from it was tying
arrangement, subject to quasi per se rule), with Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza,
Inc., 922 F. Supp. 1055, 1059-63 (E.D.Pa. 1996), aff'd, 124 F.3d 430 (3d Cir. 1997) (refusing
to analyze similar agreement as tie-in).
111. Any non-universal approach that denies the existence of a singular definition of
exclusionary conduct (a category that excludes the sort of rule consumer welfarebalancing approach proposed by Popofsky and Lao) could not meet this criterion. See
supra notes 94-104 and accompanying text.
112. The RRC and consumer welfare-balancing approaches, as well as the rule welfarebalancing approach proposed by Lao and Popofsky, fail to meet this criterion. See supra
notes 44-45, 62-65, 105-07 and accompanying text. So do sacrifice-based tests (the profit
sacrifice and no economic sense tests) when they are employed to evaluate conduct
involving "degrees" (e.g., discounting, loyalty requirements). See supra notes 89-92 and
accompanying text.
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acquittals of truly exclusionary practices."' Yet it would also seek to
avoid the social losses that result when the law improperly condemns
or discourages efficient but novel practices that tend to disadvantage
the perpetrator's rivals.114
Several of these objectives are in tension. Reducing social losses
from false acquittals may require broadening the definition of
unreasonably exclusionary conduct, but doing so enhances the risk of
false convictions and thereby increases the social cost resulting from
the deterrence of efficient but novel business practices. Aggregate
social losses from incorrect liability judgments (i.e., the sum of social
losses from false acquittals and false convictions) may be reduced by
crafting a more nuanced definition of exclusionary conduct, but such
a definition would be more difficult for adjudicators and business
planners to administer. Efforts to achieve one key objectiveavoidance of false negatives, avoidance of false positives, or
administrability-tend to impair another. Accordingly, an optimal
definition of unreasonably exclusionary conduct would (1) provide a
common thread that ties together all instances of unreasonably
exclusionary conduct and comports with widely accepted intuitions
about what constitutes improper competitive conduct and (2)
minimize the sum of "decision costs" (the aggregate cost to
adjudicators and business planners of administering the definition and
rules that flow from it) and "error costs" (the sum of allocative
inefficiencies resulting from false acquittals of bad behavior and
foregone efficiencies resulting from false convictions of good
behavior)."'s

113. The equally efficient rival approach fails to satisfy this criterion because it acquits
conduct that would render a rival less efficient than the defendant. See supra notes 32-33
and accompanying text.
114. Given their indeterminacy and lack of reliable safe harbors, the RRC, consumer
welfare-balancing, sacrifice-based, and "rule" consumer welfare-balancing approaches are
likely to chill novel business practices that enhance efficiency but may foreclose rivals. See
supra notes 44-45, 62-68, 89-92, 105-10 and accompanying text.
115. Judge Easterbrook famously proposed this latter criterion for antitrust liability
rules. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1, 16 (1984).
Sometimes called the "decision-theoretic" principle, the criterion has been quite
influential among antitrust scholars. See, e.g., David S. Evans & A. Jorge Padilla,
DesigningAntitrust Rules for Assessing UnilateralPractices:A Neo-Chicago Approach, 72
U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 85 (2005) (setting forth an error cost approach to crafting rules
governing unilateral practices); Keith N. Hylton & Michael Salinger, Tying Law and
Policy: A Decision-Theoretic Approach, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 469, 470 (2001) (applying
criterion in analyzing law on tie-ins); Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, Google and
the Limits of Antitrust: The Case Against the Case Against Google, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 171, 178 (2011) (using decision theory to argue against antitrust intervention on
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The Exclusion of a Competitive Rival ("ECR") Definition

Consistent with the foregoing criteria, I propose the following
approach: a defendant has engaged in unreasonably exclusionary
conduct if its behavior as a whole has excluded a competitive rival
from the defendant's market, or is likely to do so, where a
''competitive rival" is one that is as aggressive as the defendant in
seeking out business opportunities and either is as efficient as the
defendant or would be but for the defendant's exclusionary acts. The
defendant's behavior "as a whole" includes all its dealings with
excluded or potentially excluded rivals, not simply the challenged
conduct.
This proposed "exclusion of a competitive rival" approach
comports with prevailing intuitions about what constitutes fair and
vigorous competition. A competitor may do all it can to get aheadshort of rigging the game to beat a more deserving rival or taking
steps that would prevent rivals from rising to the top-and talented
rivals are expected to take aggressive action to stay in the game. More
importantly, the proposed definition would avoid most of the pitfalls
that have bedeviled other proposals. Unlike Posner's equally efficient
rival approach, it could condemn conduct that renders the
perpetrator's rivals less efficient.116 Unlike the RRC, consumer
welfare-balancing (both act and rule), and sacrifice-based approaches,
it would enable the creation of reliable safe harbors for firms
considering practices that are efficient on the whole but are either
novel (so no liability rule exists) or governed by existing liability rules
that are somewhat indeterminate (so business planners cannot be
confident about the decision an adjudicator will reach).117 Unlike a
truly non-universal approach, the ECR definition comports with ruleof-law norms by identifying a common thread that ties together
instances of unreasonably exclusionary conduct. t s And the liability
basis of Google's alleged search manipulation). It also seems to underlie many recent
decisions by the Supreme Court. See Thomas A. Lambert, The Roberts Court and the
Limits of Antitrust, 52 B.C. L. REv. 871, 873 (2011) (arguing that the Roberts Court's
antitrust jurisprudence is not reflexively "pro-business" but instead reflects an effort to
minimize the sum of decision and error costs).
116. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text (discussing equally efficient rival
definition's failure to condemn conduct rendering a rival less efficient).
117. See supra notes 44-45, 62-68, 86-92, 105-10 and accompanying text (discussing
indeterminacy of and lack of reliable safe harbors created by RRC, consumer welfarebalancing, and sacrifice-based approaches).
118. See supra notes 98-105 and accompanying text (explaining why non-universal
standards approaches that do not reduce to rule consumer welfare-balancing violate rule
of law norms).
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rules it would generate would be easier to administer than any of the
other proposed approaches. Accordingly, the ECR definition satisfies
the two criteria set forth above: It defines unreasonably exclusionary
conduct in a unified, coherent manner and, as the following subpart
shows, would generate legal rules capable of minimizing the sum of
decision and error costs.
C.

Operationalizingthe ProposedDefinition
The ability to generate clear guidance and reliable safe harbors
for business planners-something the RRC, consumer welfarebalancing, and sacrifice-based approaches lackll-iS perhaps the
most appealing feature of the ECR definition of exclusionary
conduct. It liberates firms to experiment with novel business practices
that are likely efficient but could have the effect of driving some rivals
out of business or reducing their scale. Accordingly, a consideration
of how the ECR definition would operate in practice should begin by
examining the safe harbors the definition would generate. Part II.C.1
considers the contours of those safe harbors. Part II.C.2 then
addresses how courts adjudicating monopolization and attempted
monopolization claims could structure a general rule of reason
embracing the ECR approach.
1. Safe Harbors for Different Species of Exclusionary Conduct
As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit observed, "the
means of illicit exclusion, like the means of legitimate competition,
are myriad."120 It would be a fool's errand to attempt to catalogue
exhaustively the types of exclusionary conduct in which a defendant
might engage. Indeed, the impossibility of ex ante specification of all
the types of exclusionary conduct is the chief motivation for this
Article. We need a generalized definition of exclusionary conduct
precisely because we cannot predict what sorts of exclusion-causing,
but possibly efficient, conduct firms might attempt in the future, and
we need to provide business planners with some guidance about how
to avoid liability.
Despite the impossibility of exhaustively cataloguing all species
of exclusionary conduct, it is possible to articulate a list that covers
119. See supra notes 44-45, 62-68, 86-92, 105-10 and accompanying text. The equally
efficient rival definition provides similar clarity, but its failure to condemn conduct that
prevents rivals from attaining equivalent efficiency causes it to be significantly
underdeterrent. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
120. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per
curiam).
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most of the ways a firm might try to create market power by
excluding its rivals. Experience with Section 2 has revealed that
unreasonable market exclusion that creates or enhances market
power is likely to occur via either predation (the perpetrator sets its
prices so low or bids up input costs so high that rivals can remain in
competition with it only by pricing at unsustainable levels); market
foreclosure (the perpetrator deprives its rivals of customers by
persuading buyers to give their business to the perpetrator or
withhold it from the perpetrator's rivals); input denial (the
perpetrator denies rivals access to something they need to conduct
their business); or naked acts of exclusion (a perpetrator engages in an
act that is unabashedly aimed at hobbling its rivals and creates no
apparent social benefit-e.g., the perpetrator fraudulently obtains a
market power creating patent or intentionally destroys a rival's
productive facilities).121 Because a generalized definition of
exclusionary conduct is needed only for evaluating mixed bag conduct
that exhibits both procompetitive and anticompetitive tendencies,1 22
our concern here is with the first three species of unreasonable
exclusion: predation, foreclosure, and input-denial.
As the following discussion shows, the ECR approach enables
the creation of reliable safe harbors for business conduct within each
of those species as well as for "hybrid" practices that combine
features of multiple species.
a.

Predation

One way a firm might exclude its rivals and thereby enhance its
market power is to compete in such a way that its rivals must
somehow harm themselves in order to win business. On the sale side,
such predation could consist of charging below-cost (predatory)
prices, which forces even one's equally efficient rivals to suffer losses
in order to win sales,123 or charging so-called "limit" prices that are
above the seller's own incremental cost but below both its profitmaximizing price level and its rivals' incremental costs.'24 When acting
121. See generally Bush DOJ Single-Firm Conduct Report, supra note 22, at 49-76
(predation), 113-15 (foreclosure), 119-30 (input denial), and 131-41 (naked acts of
exclusion).
122. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
123. See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 117 (1986) (discussing
anticompetitive harm from below-cost pricing).
124. See Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, PredatoryPricingand Related Practices
UnderSection 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REv. 697, 705-06 (1975) (explaining how
limit pricing by a firm operating at a more efficient scale than potential entrants can
maintain its monopoly by excluding those entrants from the market).
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as a buyer of inputs, a firm may predate by bidding up the price of
inputs higher than the level at which it could acquire the amount it
needs (or, what is economically equivalent, by simply buying a greater
quantity than it needs so that competing input buyers have to raise
their bid prices).'" This harms the perpetrator's input market rivals
by raising their costs, and the harm is particularly grave if the rivals
cannot pass those higher costs on to consumers because, for example,
the overbidding firm is an output market rival and holds down its own
126
prices.
Of course, lowering output prices and bidding up input prices are
usually desirable practices. Price cuts always benefit consumers (at
least in the short-run) and typically represent procompetitive
attempts to win business legitimately. 127 Bidding up input prices is
usually done to ensure access to an adequate supply of inputs, but
even stockpiling inputs or bidding up prices above the level required
to satisfy immediate needs can be efficiency enhancing.12 8 Because
output price-slashing and input price-raising are at worst mixed bags,
antitrust doctrine should take care not to condemn or deter their
efficient uses while pursuing harmful predation.

125. See Bush DOJ Single-Firm Conduct Report, supra note 22, at 73; see also
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc., 549 U.S. 312, 322 n.3
(2007) (observing that "[p]redatory bidding on inputs is not analytically different from
predatory overbuying of inputs").
126. See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser, 549 U.S. at 316 (observing that defendant held its output
prices down while bidding up input prices, causing plaintiff, a rival in both input and
output markets, to suffer heavy losses).
127. See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 340 (1990)
(observing that "[low prices benefit consumers regardless of how those prices are set");
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986) (observing
that "cutting prices in order to increase business often is the very essence of
competition").
128. As the Weyerhaeuser Court explained:
There are myriad legitimate reasons-ranging from benign to affirmatively
procompetitive-why a buyer might bid up input prices. A firm might bid up
inputs as a result of miscalculation of its input needs or as a response to increased
consumer demand for its outputs. A more efficient firm might bid up input prices
to acquire more inputs as a part of a procompetitive strategy to gain market share
in the output market. A firm that has adopted an input-intensive production
process might bid up inputs to acquire the inputs necessary for its process. Or a
firm might bid up input prices to acquire excess inputs as a hedge against the risk
of future rises in input costs or future input shortages. There is nothing illicit about
these bidding decisions. Indeed, this sort of high bidding is essential to competition
and innovation on the buy side of the market.
Weyerhaeuser, 549 U.S. at 323-24 (internal citation omitted).
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Seeking to exercise such care, the Supreme Court has set forth
predation liability rules that include reliable safe harbors. The Court's
Brooke Group decision insulates from liability any simple discount
that results in a price above "an appropriate measure" of the seller's
cost,129 which most lower courts have defined as the seller's average
variable cost."o In Weyerhaeuser, the Court extended the Brooke
Group rule to the overbidding context, creating a safe harbor for
aggressive input-bidding (or overbuying) that does not drive the
buyer's output price below incremental cost after its higher input
costs are accounted for."'
These reliable safe harbors, which enable firms to engage in
price-cutting and aggressive input buying without fear of liability,
could not exist if unreasonably exclusionary conduct were defined
according to the RRC, consumer welfare-balancing, or sacrifice-based
approaches. Under an RRC approach, a defendant that slashed its
price to a point that some rivals could not match would worry that a
reviewing court would determine that some increment of the price cut
failed to enhance its efficiency and thus unjustifiably raised its rivals'
costs (by reducing their scale). On the bidding side, a defendant that
had bid up input prices would worry that a reviewing court might
deem some increment of its high bid price to be unnecessary to attain
needed inputs (or achieve some other efficiency) and thus an instance
of unjustifiably raising rivals' costs. 13 2 Under a consumer welfarebalancing approach, a dominant firm that cut its price to a level above
its cost but to some point that might be deemed below the level
necessary to encourage entry would worry that a reviewing court
would find the consumer benefit of immediate lower prices to be
outweighed by consumer harm in the form of sustained market
power. On the bidding side, a firm that bid up prices to a point that
injured its rival input buyers but did not cause it to price below cost in
the output market would worry that a reviewing court would deem
129. Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222 (1993)
("First, a plaintiff seeking to establish competitive injury resulting from a rival's low prices
must prove that the prices complained of are below an appropriate measure of its rival's
costs.").
130. See William J. Kolasky, Network Effects: A Contrarian View, 7 GEO. MASON L.
REv. 577, 605 (1999) (observing that in applying Brooke Group's below-cost pricing
element, "most courts use average variable cost").
131. Weyerhaeuser, 549 U.S. at 325 ("A plaintiff must prove that the alleged predatory
bidding led to below-cost pricing of the predator's outputs. That is, the predator's bidding
on the buy side must have caused the cost of the relevant output to rise above the
revenues generated in the sale of those outputs.").
132. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
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likely consumer harms from increased monopsony power to outweigh
the benefits the higher bid prices would ultimately create for
consumers. 133 Under the no economic sense test, a discounter would
always worry that some increment of its price cut would be deemed
economically irrational but for an increase in market power, and an
input buyer that pushed bid prices above the level required to attain
its immediate needs could have a difficult time establishing some
economic sense for that conduct apart from an increase in market
power.134 The RRC, consumer welfare-balancing, and sacrifice-based
approaches, then, could not sustain the safe harbors the Supreme
Court has created for potentially predatory conduct.
The ECR approach, by contrast, could do so." Any rival seller
that is as efficient as the defendant could match a price cut resulting
in an above-cost price for the defendant's product, and if the
defendant bid up input prices but only to a point at which its
incremental cost was still less than its output price, any equally
efficient output producer could match the bid price for the input.
Smaller-scale rivals that are not currently as efficient as the defendant
but would be upon reaching MES may have to raise capital to meet
the discount or input price and grow their business, but those that are
genuinely capable of matching the defendant's efficiency upon
achieving MES ought to be able to do so. Most firms, at some point in
their existence, incur costs in excess of their revenues; it takes money
to make money. But just as a new firm with a promising business plan
can attain capital to cover start-up costs, any determined firm that
genuinely could match a profit-making defendant's efficiency when
operating at MES ought to be able to attain the financing to achieve
that scale and earn similar profit.136 Accordingly, neither cutting price
to a level above one's incremental cost nor bidding up input prices to
a point at which one's output is still priced above cost could exclude a
133. See supra Part I.C.
134. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
135. So could the equally efficient rival approach, but that approach, as noted, is
underdeterrent. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
136. See 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT HOVENKAMP & JOHN L. SOLOW,
ANTITRUST LAW [ 421b at 66-67 (2d ed. 2002) ("If capital markets are working well, new
investment will be made in any market earning anything above competitive returns-a
term defined to include sufficient profit to attract new capital-regardless of the absolute
cost of entry."); GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 67-70 (1968);
Harold Demsetz, Barriers to Entry, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 47, 49-53 (1982); Harold
Demsetz, Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy, 16 J.L. & ECON. 1, 4
(1973); Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV.
925, 929-30 (1979). Criticisms of this assertion are considered below. See infra notes 20710 and accompanying text.
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determined rival possessing, at MES, the ability to match the
defendant's efficiency-that is, a competitive rival. The ECR
approach, unlike the RRC, consumer welfare-balancing, and
sacrifice-based approaches, thus supports the existing safe harbors for
potentially predatory conduct.
b.

Market Foreclosure

Businesses require customers to survive and thrive. Accordingly,
a second way a firm might create or enhance its market power is by
denying sales opportunities to its rivals. In an extreme case, the lack
of available customers may drive a rival out of business altogether.
More commonly, denying customers to one's rival will not cause it to
exit the market entirely but will instead, by reducing demand for the
rival's offering and thereby shrinking its output, cause the rival to lose
scale efficiencies so that its per-unit costs rise.137 Facing higher
production costs, the "foreclosed" rival will be less able to impose
pricing discipline on the perpetrator.
Illicit exclusive dealing and tying arrangements are the
prototypical foreclosure-focused Section 2 offenses. 138 Every exclusive
dealing arrangement involves some degree of foreclosure because the
buyer is contractually forbidden to deal with the seller's rivals.'39
Tying arrangements occasion foreclosure in the tied product market
because buyers seeking the seller's tying product, over which the
seller has market power, must also purchase its tied product, reducing

137. See generally Joshua D. Wright, Moving Beyond Naive Foreclosure Analysis, 19
GEO. MASON L. REv. 1163, 1166-71 (2012) (discussing economics of foreclosure).
138. In addition to being policed as exclusionary acts that may violate Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, anticompetitive exclusive dealing and tying arrangements are expressly
forbidden by Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2012) (prohibiting formation of
exclusive contracts, leases, or sales that have the effect of lessening competition or
creating a monopoly), and may be deemed agreements in unreasonable restraint of trade,
violating Section 1 of the Sherman Act, id. § 1. When employed in an effort to create
market power, tying and exclusive dealing are most appropriately analyzed under Section
2. Cf Herbert Hovenkamp, The Obama Administration and Section 2 of the Sherman Act,
90 B.U. L. REV. 1611, 1613-14 (2010) (discussing overlapping statutory bases for policing
tying and exclusive dealing and observing that "one notable development in recent law has
been the increased use of Section 2 of the Sherman Act to pursue tying and exclusive
dealing, although both of these typically involve an 'agreement' among two or more
firms").
139. "Exclusive dealing describes an arrangement whereby one party's willingness to
deal with another is contingent upon that other party (1) dealing with it exclusively or (2)
purchasing a large share of its requirements from it." Bush DOJ Single-Firm Conduct
Report, supra note 22, at 131.
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sales opportunities for rival sellers of the tied product." If a seller's
exclusive dealing or tying arrangement covers a large proportion of
the sales opportunities that would otherwise be available to its rivals,
those rivals may be forced to reduce their output so much that they
fall below MES and are impaired in their ability to constrain the
seller's pricing or are perhaps driven out of business altogether. 14 1
But exclusive dealing and tying arrangements, despite their
potential to create foreclosure-induced market power, are not
always-or even usually-bad. Well-known procompetitive uses of
exclusive dealing include providing a guaranteed supply for buyers or
predictable demand for sellers, 142 encouraging manufacturer
investments in dealers by preventing "interbrand free-riding,"143 and
enhancing distributional efficiency by facilitating manufacturer
contracting for distributor promotion.'" Tie-ins may be imposed for
such procompetitive (or competitively neutral) ends as ensuring tying
140. In a tying arrangement or "tie-in," a purchaser of some product over which the
seller has market power (the "tying" product) is required also to purchase some other
"tied" product from the seller. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958).
141. On exclusive dealing's ability to drive rivals below MES, see Bush DOJ SingleFirm Conduct Report, supra note 22, at 136-37 ("[E]xclusive dealing can be a way that a
firm acquires or maintains monopoly power by impairing the ability of rivals to grow into
effective competitors that erode the firm's position."); Daniel A. Crane & Graciela
Miralles, Toward a Unified Theory of Exclusionary Vertical Restraints, 84 S. CAL. L. REV.
605, 640 n.137 (2011) (noting use of MES to assess anticompetitive foreclosure); Benjamin
Klein, Exclusive Dealingas Competition for Distribution "On the Merits", 12 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 119, 122-28 (2003) ("[1]f exclusive contracts foreclose a sufficient share of
distribution to rivals for a significant time so that what remains to serve competitors
cannot support a manufacturer of [MES], the exclusive will force existing competitors and
potential new entrants to operate at a cost disadvantage. The exclusives then may have the
effect of driving out and/or preventing entry of manufacturing competitors until sufficient
distribution becomes available."). On tying's ability to drive rivals below MES, see
Elhauge, supra note 22, at 413-14; Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and
Exclusion, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 837 (1990).
142. See Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 334 (1961) ("In the case
of the buyer [an exclusive dealing contract] 'may assure supply,' while on the part of the
seller it 'may make possible the substantial reduction of selling expenses, give protection
against price fluctuations, and ... offer the possibility of a predictable market.' " (quoting
Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306-07 (1949))).
143. See Bush DOJ Single-Firm Conduct Report, supra note 22, at 131, 139 ("Exclusive
dealing is frequently procompetitive, as when it enables manufacturers and retailers to
overcome free-rider issues .... For example, a manufacturer may be unwilling to train its
distributors optimally if distributors can take that training and use it to sell products of the
manufacturer's rivals."); Klein, supra note 141, at 137-41 ("A commonly recognized
efficiency rationale for exclusive dealing is the protection of manufacturer property rights
on investments manufacturers provide to distributors.").
144. See Klein, supra note 141, at 141-60 (arguing that exclusive contracts between
manufacturers and distributors are economically efficient because they assure a return on
the manufacturers' investment).
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product quality or protecting seller goodwill,145 engaging in outputenhancing price discrimination,1 46 expanding market output by
eliminating double-marginalization, 4 7 or evading price regulation.148
In light of the legitimate uses of tying, exclusive dealing, and other
foreclosure-inducing business practices, antitrust doctrine should take
care not to over-deter.
Over-deterrence of foreclosure-inducing conduct is likely,
however, under the RRC, consumer welfare-balancing, and sacrificebased approaches to identifying unreasonably exclusionary conduct.
A firm embarking on a course of conduct involving exclusive dealing,
tying, or some other foreclosure-causing practice generally cannot
predict with certainty the market consequences of its arrangement
(e.g., the degree of foreclosure the arrangement will occasion, its
effects on rivals, etc.). Business planners therefore often cannot
guarantee, when embarking upon a novel arrangement, that
contemplated conduct will limit foreclosure to some pre-determined
levels. Moreover, a reviewing court evaluating matters in retrospect

145. See, e.g., Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 833 F.2d 1342, 1348-51
(9th Cir. 1987).
146. Tie-ins may facilitate price discrimination via "metering" or Stigler-type bundling.
See infra notes 229-32 and accompanying text. Both species of tying-induced price
discrimination may enhance total welfare. See Erik Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp,
Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Harm, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 925, 943-52 (2010) (discussing
efficiency of price-discriminating "metering" tie-ins); Lambert, supra note 36, at 934-50
(explaining why metering tie-ins tend to enhance total welfare); id at 950-53 (explaining
that price discrimination via "Stigler-type bundling" is an efficient way of solving the
pricing dilemmas which affect manufacturers of negligible-cost goods).
147. As Herbert Hovenkamp has explained:
Double marginalization occurs when separate firms selling complementary
products each have some market power, are unable to pool their output, and each
assesses a profit-maximizing output rate individually. Under quite robust
assumptions, the profit-maximizing output is higher if a single firm offers the
complements together or the two firms can coordinate their output by licensing
together. The benefit accrues both to consumers in the form of lower prices, and to
producers in the form of higher output. Eliminating double marginalization
explains many instances of tying ....
Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Movement of Technology, 19 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 1119, 1129 (2012).
148. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements and Class Actions, 36 VAND. L.
REV. 213, 234 (1983) ("Tying arrangements in price-regulated industries may be efficiency
creating."); Thomas B. Leary, Former Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Antitrust Law as a
Balancing Act, Address at the Tenth Annual Seattle Computer Law Conference (Dec. 17,
1999), http://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1999/12/antitrust-law-balancing-act (discussing
use of tie-ins to evade price regulation and observing that "[w]hile regulatory evasion [via
tying] may supply the motive for particular conduct that may be otherwise inexplicable, it
does not constitute independent evidence of competitive harm").
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may determine that some increment of the foreclosure-causing
conduct was unnecessary to achieve an enhancement in the
defendant's efficiency (RRC) or created greater consumer harm than
benefit (consumer welfare-balancing) or would have been
economically irrational but for its ability to exclude rivals (no
economic sense test).'49 Firms seeking to employ foreclosure-causing
arrangements for procompetitive (or competitively neutral) purposes
therefore incur significant liability risks under the RRC, consumer
welfare-balancing, and no economic sense approaches.
The ECR approach, by contrast, generates a reliable safe harbor
because any defendant engaging in foreclosure-causing conduct may
take steps to avoid excluding truly competitive rivals. Consider how a
competitive rival would maintain (and, if necessary, grow) its scale in
the face of a competitor defendant's foreclosure-causing conduct. If
truly determined, a rival losing a significant number of customers
because of the defendant's conduct would (after exhausting all other
reasonably available options for expanding its sales) seek to maintain
scale by offering to become a supplier to the defendant, ultimately
lowering its price to the level of its incremental cost at the scale it
would achieve as a supplier, presumably MES. 5s If the rival could
meet or beat the defendant's productive efficiency at that scale, then
any defendant that was pursuing efficiency rather than seeking to
enhance its market power by foreclosing rivals would be willing to
accept the rival's supplier offer.151 If a rival complaining of exclusion
did not seek to become a supplier to the defendant or did not lower
its price to the level of its incremental cost at MES, then it was not a
149. See supra notes 39, 62-64, 88-91 and accompanying text.
150. If the rival still would not achieve MES, or at least a scale sufficient to allow it to
match the defendant's efficiency, by becoming a supplier to the defendant, then it would
seem that market demand does not warrant the firm's existence (i.e., the number of
producers in the market is inefficiently large), so the exit of the firm would not cause an
efficiency loss. See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN, HERBERT HOVENKAMP & HOWARD A.
SHELANSKI, ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY AND PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS,
PROBLEMS 41-42 (6th ed. 2009) (discussing determinants of optimal number of producers
in a market). See generally F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET
STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (3d ed. 1990) (providing a broad overview
of the way industrial organizations have adapted their businesses to the American
economy).
151. Conversely, an exclusion-causing defendant that turned down a supplier offer that
would enhance its profits but enable a competitive rival to remain in business and
maintain its scale would evince an anticompetitive intent. Cf Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen
Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 601 (1985) (concluding that dominant defendant's
refusal to continue profit-enhancing venture with rival had "evidentiary significance" and
therefore upholding jury's verdict that defendant had engaged in unreasonably
exclusionary conduct).
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determined rival. If the rival did so but its offer was unfavorable in
that the price demanded exceeded the defendant's cost or the quality
of its offering was inferior, then the rival could not meet or beat the
defendant's efficiency operating at MES. Only where a foreclosed
rival made an attractive supplier offer that the defendant rejected
would the defendant have excluded a competitive rival. Accordingly, a
defendant utilizing exclusive dealing, tying, or other foreclosureinducing conduct could avoid liability under the ECR approach by
considering all offers by its foreclosed rivals to act as its supplier and
turning down only those offers that would be economically
disadvantageous (because the rival's offered price, adjusted for
quality, is greater than the defendant's own cost). The ECR approach
therefore generates the sort of reliable safe harbor that eludes the
RRC, consumer welfare-balancing, and no economic sense
approaches.
c.

UnilateralInput-Denial

A third way a firm may enhance its market power is by
unilaterally denying its rivals access to various inputs they need to
conduct their business.152 Courts have thus sometimes deemed it
unreasonably exclusionary to deny rivals access to an "essential
facility"' 53 or to unilaterally refuse to deal with them. 5 4 Some lower
courts have gone so far as to suggest that dominant firms may have a
duty to pre-disclose their business plans-effective "inputs" for rivals
engaged in their own planning-but such rulings have been overruled
on appeal."ss More recently, the Federal Trade Commission
152. Concerted input denials, such as group boycotts, concerted refusals to deal, and
some vertical mergers, may also be exclusionary. They are not addressed here because
they are typically and more appropriately analyzed as unreasonable restraints of trade, a
violation of Sherman Act Section 1. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (condemning all contracts,
combinations, and conspiracies that unreasonably restrain trade). The ECR definition
could, however, accommodate a safe harbor for concerted input denials challenged as
instances of actual or attempted monopolization. Any determined rival facing exclusion
because of a dominant firm's contractual tying-up of inputs (e.g., via exclusive sales
agreements with input suppliers or a vertical merger) would offer to supply its services to
the dominant firm at a price approaching the rival's cost. If the rival could, at MES, match
the dominant firm's input-processing efficiency, then the dominant firm should be willing
to accept its offer. Thus, demonstrating a willingness to accept a supplier offer from a putupon rival should insulate a dominant firm from Section 2 liability premised on a
concerted input denial.
153. See MCI Commc'ns Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir.
1983); Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992-93 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
154. See Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 605-11.
155. See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 281 (2d Cir. 1979)
(disapproving of district court's jury instruction that dominant camera manufacturer's
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considered what is essentially a unilateral input denial theory in its
now-terminated investigation into Google's alleged manipulation of
Internet search results. 1 6 Firms that compete with Google in
providing web-based content complained that they need favorable
placement in Google's search results in order to compete successfully
and that Google denied that "input" by artificially manipulating the
ranking of its search results."' As the Google matter shows, unilateral
input-denial is a broad and manipulable category of exclusionary
conduct, an area in which a general definition of unreasonable
exclusion would be particularly helpful.
As with the other types of exclusionary conduct, "unilateral input
denials" are generally mixed bags. On the one hand, if a dominant
firm controls something (e.g., a physical facility or information) that
its rival could "use to make more, different, or better products,"
consumers might be better off if the dominant firm were forced to
deal with the rival.' On the other hand, it is the right to control and
profit from one's property that generates the incentive to create the
property in the first place, so the ability to withhold an input
unilaterally may further dynamic efficiency by fostering innovation." 9
Moreover, any remedy involving forced sharing requires difficult
decisions about what must be shared, at what price, and under what
terms. Generalist courts are poorly suited to make those decisions

failure to predisclose forthcoming changes in film cartridges to rival film producers could
be "on balance an exclusionary course of conduct").
156. See STATEMENT OF THE FED. TRADE COMM'N REGARDING GOOGLE'S SEARCH
PRACTICES, F.T.C. FILE No. 111-0163, GOOGLE INC., (Jan. 3, 2013), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public-statements/statement-commissionregarding-googles-search-practices/130103brillgooglesearchstmt.pdf.
157. See, e.g., Adam Raff & Shivaun Raff, Foundem's Google Story,
SEARCHNEUTRALITY.ORG (Aug. 18, 2009), http://www.searchneutrality.org/eu-launchesformal-investigation/foundem-google-story.
158. See Bush DOJ Single-Firm Conduct Report, supra note 22, at 119 ("If a
monopolist has something that a rival wants to use to make more, different, or better
products, it can appear that consumers would be better off if the monopolist were forced
to deal with its rival.").
159. See Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
407-08 (2004) ("Firms may acquire monopoly power by establishing an infrastructure that
renders them uniquely suited to serve their customers. Compelling such firms to share the
source of their advantage ... may lessen the incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or
both to invest in those economically beneficial facilities."); Bush DOJ Single-Firm
Conduct Report, supra note 22, at 119 ("[I]f the monopolist is forced to deal with the rival,
the monopolist's incentives to spend the necessary time and resources to innovate may be
diminished. Moreover, the incentives of other firms to invest and innovate ... may be
diminished if they believe they will be forced to share a successful innovation.").
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and to enforce sharing obligations.160 For these reasons, many
commentators have called into question whether antitrust should ever
require a firm to deal with its rivals. 16 1
The consumer welfare-balancing, RRC, and sacrifice-based
definitions of unreasonably exclusionary conduct, however, would
call for all manner of forced sharing. It is easy to imagine a court
determining that a balancing of consumer welfare effects-even after
accounting for dynamic effects turning on incentives to innovatecalls for a firm to share its physical facility, information, or business
plans.162 Similarly, a court could decide that a failure to share such
assets either raises the costs of the non-sharer's rivals without
sufficient justification,' or, in light of the revenue the non-sharer
foregoes by denying access, makes no economic sense but for its
tendency to enhance market power." Thus, the consumer welfarebalancing, RRC, and sacrifice-based tests could not provide reliable
safe harbors for firms that refused to collaborate with their rivals.
The ECR approach, by contrast, could do so. On first glance, it
may seem that any firm that is reliant upon a rival for an input could
not be a competitive rival, so the ECR approach would sanction all
unilateral input denials. But a firm seeking access to an input
controlled by a vertically integrated rival may be equally or more
efficient than the input controller in the aspects of production not

involving the input. Sellers of local telephone service, for example,
must provide both access to a network and customer service. An
upstart local telephone service provider that must lease access to
another's network might still be equally or more efficient in providing
the customer service part of the offering."s The ECR approach thus
would not create a rule of per se legality for unilateral input denials
on the theory that any rival needing access to an input controlled by a
competitor could not, by definition, be a competitive rival.
160. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408 ("Enforced sharing also requires antitrust courts to act
as central planners, identifying the proper price, quantity, and other terms of dealing-a
role for which they are ill suited."); Bush DOJ Single-Firm Conduct Report, supra note 22,
at 119 ("[I]f forced sharing is required, difficult decisions must be made on precisely what
needs to be shared, at what price, and under what other terms.").
161. See, e.g., HOVENKAMP, supra note 77, at 244-48, 270; POSNER, supra note 10, at
242.
162. See supraPart I.B.
163. See supranotes 45-46, 61-64 and accompanying text.
164. See supranotes 82-92 and accompanying text.
165. Cf Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. LinkLine Commc'ns Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 443 (2009)
(recognizing that Internet service providers without access to their own transmission lines
nevertheless could be competitive with a vertically integrated rival in customer service
aspect of business).
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Rather, to stay within a safe harbor under the ECR approach, a
firm denying access to some necessary input would need to be able to
show that its denial of access would not exclude a rival that is
competitive-both determined and equally efficient when operating
at MES-in some discrete aspect of the business (e.g., customer
service in the example above). Faced with the prospect of no access to
a necessary input, a determined "single-aspect" rival would seek to
supply that aspect to the vertically integrated firm controlling the
input and would be willing to reduce its price to the level of its
incremental cost. If the rival is truly as efficient as the inputcontrolling firm or is able to match that firm's efficiency after growing
to MES, the single-aspect rival ought to be able to make a supplier
offer that would be attractive to the input-controlling firm.
Accordingly, a firm controlling a crucial input could ensure against
liability for input denial by being willing to accept any attractive
supplier offer. A local telephone company controlling the local
network, for example, could avoid antitrust liability based on its
refusal to give access to its network by establishing either that the
complaining rival failed to offer to supply its services to the local
telephone company (in which case the rival was not determined) or
that the rival's supplier offer was unfavorable on cost or quality
grounds (in which case the rival was not equally efficient when
operating at MES). Once again, then, the ECR approach, unlike the
RRC, consumer welfare-balancing, and no economic sense
approaches, accommodates reliable safe harbors.
d. Hybrid Practices
In recent years, antitrust courts have confronted a number of
"hybrid" business practices that are both foreclosure-inducing and
potentially predatory but do not fall squarely within traditional
conduct classifications.1 66 Loyalty rebates and bundled discounts, for
example, are not strictly exclusive dealing, tying, or predatory pricing
arrangements, but, they combine aspects of each. Again, the ECR
definition of exclusionary conduct, unlike the RRC, consumer
welfare-balancing, and sacrifice-based approaches, could offer
166. See, e.g., ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 273-81 (3d Cir. 2012)
(considering loyalty discounts), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2025 (2013); Cascade Health
Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 906 (9th Cir. 2008) (discussing bundled discounts);
LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 154-57 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (considering bundled
discounts); Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1061-62 (8th Cir.
2000) (confronting loyalty rebates); Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 920
F. Supp. 455, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (examining bundled discounts).
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reliable safe harbors for firms contemplating efficient instances of
such practices.
A loyalty rebate (or discount) is a price cut on all of a buyer's
purchases of some item from a seller, where the price concession is
conditioned upon purchasing some predetermined quantity of the
item-usually, some percentage of the buyer's requirements.1 67 A
producer of surgical sutures, for example, might pay a 15% rebate on
all purchases of the producer's sutures by any hospital that buys at
least 70% of its suture requirements from that producer. 6 Loyalty
rebates resemble predatory pricing in that they are price cuts that
some rivals may have difficulty meeting, and they resemble exclusive
dealing in that they may have the effect of dissuading customers from
patronizing the discounter's rivals. Yet, they are neither. Unlike
simple predatory pricing, loyalty rebates may effectively "penalize"
incremental purchases from the discounter's rivals by more than the
per-unit discount.'69 Unlike exclusive dealing, they do not require
167. See, e.g., supra note 44. Conditioning loyalty discounts or rebates on purchasing a
percentage of the buyers' requirements, rather than a set amount of the product at issue,
enables the seller to enhance the attractiveness of its offer by bearing the risk of a market
downturn. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Federal Trade Commission and the Sherman Act,
62 FLA. L. REV. 871, 889 (2010) ("A seller ... can improve the attractiveness of its
package if it bears .. . the market risk ... itself. This is why it tends to use market share

discounts rather than quantity discounts.").
168. See, e.g., ELHAUGE, supra note 33, at 4 n.12, 7 n.20, 9 n.24 (citing contracts
conditioning discounts to hospitals on hospitals purchasing minimum percentages of
sutures requirements from seller).
169. Consider, for example, a producer that offers a 10% loyalty rebate on its brand of
widgets, normally priced at $1.00, to any retailer that buys 70% of its widget requirements
from the producer. Suppose a multi-brand retailer normally carries 100 total widgets and
buys 70 of them from the producer. Were that retailer to buy one more of its widgets from
a rival of the producer, the retailer would lose not only $0.10, the loyalty discount on the
marginal widget, but $7.00, the loyalty rebate that would be paid on all the retailer's
purchases from the producer. See Jonathan M. Jacobson, A Note on Loyalty Discounts,
ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 2 (June 2010), available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/atsource/10/06/JunlO-Jacobson6-24f.pdf (explaining that the incremental purchase that
would prevent a buyer from achieving the minimum level of purchases required for a
loyalty discount does not cost the purchaser simply the per-unit discount; rather, the
purchaser incurs an effective "penalty" equal to the dollar value of the aggregate discount
that would otherwise be achieved on all units purchased). In light of this effect, some have
argued that a loyalty rebate offered by a firm with a dominant brand, for which a
significant level of demand is inelastic (i.e., sales of many units of the firm's brand are
effectively "uncontested"), may not be met by an equally efficient rival, that would have to
price its product below cost in order to compensate buyers for the "penalty" they would
suffer by failing to meet the purchase target required to secure the dominant firm's loyalty
rebate. See Willard K. Tom, David A. Balto & Neil W. Averitt, Anticompetitive Aspects of
Market-Share Discounts and Other Incentives to Exclusive Dealing, 67 ANTITRUST L.J.
615, 627 (2000). This issue is addressed below. See infra notes 186-91 and accompanying
text.
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customers to purchase exclusively, or even primarily, from the
discounter. They merely reward fidelity.'70
Bundled discounts are also conditional price cuts. With bundled
discounts, though, the cuts are conditioned upon achieving purchase
targets in multiple product markets.'71 For example, a diversified
producer of medical products might give a 20% discount (or pay a
20% rebate) on a hospital's purchases of sutures and scalpels if the
hospital acquires 70% of its sutures and 50% of its scalpels from the
producer.172 Like loyalty rebates, bundled discounts do not fit neatly
into antitrust's traditional categories of business conduct. They
resemble predatory pricing in that they involve price cuts that might
exclude some rivals, and they resemble tying in that they encourage
purchasers of one product also to buy a second, different product
from the seller. Again, though, they are neither. As explained below,
bundled discounts differ from the simple price cuts normally analyzed
as predatory pricing in that they may exclude equally efficient, singleproduct rivals even if they result in above-cost prices for the package
being sold.17 1 Unlike tying, bundled discounts do not require
purchasers to take both of a seller's products. They merely encourage
doing so. 174
For both loyalty rebates and bundled discounts, different courts
have articulated different liability rules. On loyalty rebates, some
have concluded that any rebate (or discount) resulting in an abovecost discounted price is immune from liability,75 while others have
rejected such a price-cost safe harbor.176 With respect to bundled
discounts, one court imposed a broad liability rule that permitted
liability even when the complaining rival was admittedly less efficient

170. See Richard M. Steuer, Bundles of Joy, ANTITRUST Spring 2008, at 25, 25
("Unlike exclusive dealing, the purchaser need not promise to forgo buying that product
from other suppliers, but the amount of the discount earned will depend on the volume it
buys from that supplier rather than from competing suppliers.").
171. See Lambert, supranote 22, at 1689.
172. See, e.g., ELHAUGE, supra note 33, at 9 nn.24 & 25 (citing contracts conditioning
discounts to hospitals on hospitals purchasing from seller minimum percentages of
requirements of multiple products).
173. See infra notes 192-96 and accompanying text.
174. See Steuer, supra note 170, at 26.
175. See, e.g., Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1061-62 (8th Cir.
2000).
176. See, e.g., ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 278 (3d Cir. 2012)
("Nothing in the case law suggests, nor would it be sound policy to hold, that above-cost
prices render an otherwise unlawful exclusive dealing agreement lawful."), cert. denied,
133 S. Ct. 2025 (2013) (considering loyalty discounts).
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than the discounter;"' another created a narrow safe harbor for
discounts that could not exclude equally efficient single-product
rivals;"' and a third crafted a relatively lenient (defendant-friendly)
rule that would require a complaining plaintiff to establish that the
discount could exclude an equally efficient rival.179
This legal uncertainty highlights the need for a generalized
definition of unreasonably exclusionary conduct. Loyalty rebates and
bundled discounts are price concessions-the sort of behavior
antitrust generally encourages 18o-and can be used to achieve all sorts
of procompetitive objectives.'"' But business planners will wisely steer
clear of such practices if they do not know what unreasonably
exclusionary conduct generally consists of and are thus unable to
ensure that their conduct will pass muster under whatever specific
liability rule is ultimately adopted. Moreover, it is not enough that
there be some general definition of unreasonably exclusionary
conduct. The definition itself must give rise to reliable safe harbors,
lest efficient but novel business practices be chilled.
For that reason, the RRC, consumer welfare-balancing, and
sacrifice-based definitions of unreasonably exclusionary conduct once
again come up lacking. Under an RRC approach, a business planner
177. See LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 155-58 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (concluding
that 3M's bundled discounts were unreasonably exclusionary); LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 277
F.3d 365, 380 (3d Cir. 2002) (observing that "LePage's's economist conceded that
LePage's is not as efficient a tape producer as 3M"), rev'd 324 F.3d 141.
178. See Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 906 (9th Cir. 2008)
(adopting "discount attribution" safe harbor, under which "the full amount of the
discounts given by the defendant on the bundle are allocated to the competitive product or
products," and only "[i]f the resulting price of the competitive product or products is
below the defendant's incremental cost" may the trier of fact find that the discount is
unreasonably exclusionary).
179. See Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 920 F. Supp. 455, 469
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("[T]his Court holds that a Section 2 plaintiff in a case like this-a case in
which a monopolist (1) faces competition on only part of a complementary group of
products, (2) offers the products both as a package and individually, and (3) effectively
forces its competitors to absorb the differential between the bundled and unbundled prices
of the product in which the monopolist has market power-must allege and prove either
that (a) the monopolist has priced below its average variable cost or (b) the plaintiff is at
least as efficient a producer of the competitive product as the defendant, but that the
defendant's pricing makes it unprofitable for the plaintiff to continue to produce.").
180. Cf Concord Boat, 207 F.3d at 1060-61 (noting that the Supreme Court has urged
caution in considering potential antitrust liability from price cuts).
181. For example, loyalty rebates may reduce inter-brand free-riding and thereby
encourage producers to make output-enhancing investments in their dealers. See infra
notes 226-31 and accompanying text (offering example of loyalty rebate used to combat
inter-brand free-riding). Bundled discounts may be a powerful tool for combating outputreducing double marginalization. See Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 146, at 95960.
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contemplating a loyalty rebate or bundled discount would have to
justify any impairment of rivals' efficiencies resulting from their
reduced scale. If a jury found that the defendant's price concession
was greater than necessary to achieve whatever productive or
distributional efficiencies it produced, the excess discount would raise
rivals' costs "regardless of any improvement in defendant
efficiency"182 and would be deemed unreasonably exclusionary.'83
Under a consumer welfare-balancing test, the legality of the price
concession would turn on the jury's difficult-to-predict decision about
whether the immediate consumer benefit of the price cuts would
outweigh the long-run harm to consumers from disadvantaging the
discounter's rivals." Under a sacrifice-based approach, legality would
turn on the jury's determination of whether some increment of the
discount or rebate made no economic sense but for its ability to
exclude rivals." There are simply no reliable safe harbors under
these approaches.
The ECR approach, by contrast, accommodates reliable safe
harbors for practices like loyalty rebates and bundled discounts. For
loyalty rebates, the most obvious safe harbor stems from a
straightforward application of Brooke Group: if the rebate results in a
discounted price that is above the discounter's incremental cost, then
it should be legal, for a competitive rival could (and would) avoid
exclusion by matching the discounted price.'"' While some have
argued that even an equally efficient rival might not be able to match
a loyalty rebate by a firm with a significantly larger "natural" base of
sales (since the rival would have to match the entire dollar value of

182. See Elhauge, supra note 7, at 330 (conduct that raises rivals' costs should be "per
se illegal if its exclusionary effect on rivals will enhance monopoly power regardless of any
improvement in defendant efficiency").
183. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 46-47, 62-65 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text. For example, if the discount were
10%, would the discounter, absent an exercise of market power, have been better off
offering only a 7% discount? If so, the incremental three percentage points of discount
would make no economic sense but for the market power it created and would thus be
unreasonably exclusionary.
186. A determined, equally efficient rival would lower its price down to the level of its
incremental cost. A determined rival that is currently less efficient than the discounter but
could match the discounter's efficiency if operating at MES would seek (and ought to be
able to obtain) financing to expand its operations to reach that level of production and
sustain a period of below-cost pricing. See Lambert, supra note 22, at 1713-14 (explaining
how a smaller rival that could match defendant's efficiency at MES could raise the capital
necessary to compete with an above-cost loyalty discount).
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the rebate on its smaller base of sales),187 this argument ignores
dynamic effects."'s Moreover, it calls at most for an altered safe
harbor in which the loyalty rebate is legal as long as "contested"
units-those that are not part of the dominant firm's natural base of
sales-are priced above cost after the entire dollar value of the
loyalty rebate is attributed to those units.'89 While this alternative safe
harbor would create administrative difficulties that weaken its
187. See Bush DOJ Single-Firm Conduct Report, supra note 22, at 107; Tom, Balto, &
Averitt, supra note 169, at 627. Suppose, for example, that the market for tennis balls
consists of two brands, Pinn and Willson; that current market shares, which reflect
consumer demand, are 60% for Pinn (the dominant brand) and 40% for rival Willson; and
that retailers stock tennis balls in those proportions. Assume also that each manufacturer's
marginal cost of is $0.90 per can of tennis balls, that each sells cans to retailers for $1 per
unit, and that MES in this market occurs at a level of production equal to 35% of market
demand. Suppose, then, that Pinn offers retailers a 10% loyalty rebate on all purchases if
they buy 70% of their requirements from Pinn. The $0.90 per unit discounted price is not
below Pinn's cost and thus would not run afoul of Brooke Group. Yet, it might cause
Willson's exclusion even though Willson is an equally efficient rival. A typical retailer that
initially (before the rebate announcement) satisfied its requirements by purchasing sixty
cans of Pinn balls for $60 and forty Willson cans for $40 could, after implementation of the
rebate plan, meet its requirements by spending $63 to obtain seventy Pinn cans and $30 to
obtain thirty Willson cans. In order to prevent a loss of market share that would drive it
below MES, Willson would need to match Pinn's $7 discount. But doing so would require
it to cut its $1 per-unit price by 17.5 cents ($0.175 * 40 = $7.00), so its price would fall
below its cost of $0.90 per unit. See Lambert, supra note 115, at 932-33.
188. A competitive rival-one that was both determined and capable at MES of
matching the defendant's efficiency-could (and would) prevent being in the position to
be excluded by an above-cost loyalty discount. For example, in the hypothetical in note
187, nondominant rival Willson, had it acted as a determined rival, would have charged a
price approaching or equal to its cost ($0.90/unit) priorto implementation of Pinn's loyalty
rebate and thereby would have grown its market share to a point at which Pinn's rebate
strategy could not have driven it below MES. Moreover, a strategy that would prevent a
nondominant but equally efficient firm like Willson from being harmed by a dominant
rival's above-cost loyalty rebate would be for it to give its own loyalty or volume discounts
from the outset, securing up-front commitments from enough buyers (in exchange for
discounted prices) to ensure that its production stayed above MES. In the end, then, any
truly competitive rival ought not to be excluded by a dominant seller's above-cost loyalty
rebate. Lambert, supra note 115, at 933. Straightforward application of the Brooke Group
safe harbor to loyalty rebates would further dynamic efficiency by signaling to rivals
capable of matching the dominant firm's efficiency that they must act aggressively-and in
a manner that benefits consumers-to grow their market share and thereby avoid
exclusion.
189. See Richard A. Duncan & Brian S. McCormac, Loyalty & Fidelity Discounts &
Rebates in the U.S. & E.U.: Will Divergence Occur Over Cost-Based Standards of
Liability?, 9 SEDONA CON. J. 133, 144 (2008) ("A cost-based standard which permits all
loyalty rebate programs which do not result in the marginal units which are affected by the
rebate being functionally discounted below marginal cost-with some consideration of
post-predation recoupment-appears to be the standard toward which commentators and
courts will soon gravitate."); Robert H. Lande, Should PredatoryPricing Rules Immunize
Exclusionary Discounts?, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 863, 877-80 (applying "discount attribution"
test to single-product loyalty discounts and rebates).
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reliability (and seem unjustified in light of dynamic effects)," the ex
ante determination it requires of business planners-i.e., how many
sales are contestable-is far simpler than those required by the RRC,
consumer welfare-balancing, and sacrifice-based approaches.19 '
For bundled discounts, the ECR approach would create a
reliable safe harbor where the discounter either (1) priced its products
above cost under the "discount attribution" test described below or
(2) maintained a willingness to accept any attractive supplier offer
from a less-diversified rival. With bundled discounts, a
straightforward application of Brooke Group-i.e., the discount is
legal as long as the discounted price for the bundle exceeds the
aggregate cost of the products within it-would be underdeterrent
because even such an "above-cost" bundled discount may exclude the
discounter's equally efficient but less diversified rivals. Because such
rivals must match on their competitive products the entire amount of
the discount that the discounter funds by giving up profit margin on a
larger collection of products, they may have no choice but to price
below cost.1" And this may be true even if (1) the discounter's
bundled price exceeds the aggregate cost of the bundled products and
(2) the less diversified rivals produce their competitive products as
efficiently as the discounter.193 In light of this possibility, a
190. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
191. The RRC definition would require the business planner to determine (1) what
level of output or market share achieves all available efficiencies and (2) what level of
discount would achieve that level of sales but no more. See supra notes 44-45 and
accompanying text. Consumer welfare-balancing would require a prediction of how a
subsequent factfinder would weigh the consumer benefits from lower prices (because of
the loyalty discount) against any consumer harm from weakened rivals. See supra notes
62-65 and accompanying text. The no economic sense test would require the planner to
determine whether each increment of discount and each incremental level of loyalty
required to achieve the discount makes economic sense but for its ability to weaken rivals.
See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
192. See LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 155 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) ("The principal
anticompetitive effect of bundled rebates ... is that when offered by a monopolist they
may foreclose portions of the market to a potential competitor who does not manufacture
an equally diverse group of products and who therefore cannot make a comparable
offer.").
193. Consider, for example, a slightly revised version of a hypothetical set forth in
Ortho Diagnostic Systems v. Abbott Laboratories,Inc., 920 F. Supp. 455, 467 (S.D.N.Y.
1996). Manufacturer A sells both shampoo and conditioner and competes against another
producer B that sells only shampoo. B is the more efficient shampoo manufacturer; it can
produce a bottle of shampoo for $1.25, while it costs A $1.50 to do so. A produces
conditioner, over which it commands some market power, for $2.50/bottle. If sold
separately, A charges $2.00 for shampoo and $4.00 for conditioner, but it charges only
$5.00 for a bundle of the products. While that $1.00 bundled discount results in an abovecost price (A's aggregate cost is $4.00), it may still tend to exclude B, which would have to
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straightforward application of Brooke Group (i.e., adoption of the socalled "aggregate discount" rule) 194 would create significant error
costs stemming from false acquittals.'95 A better price-cost safe harbor
results from application of the discount attribution test: attribute the
entire dollar value of the bundled discount to the competitive product
sold by a less diversified rival, and ask whether the product, so
discounted, is priced above the discounter's incremental cost. If so,
any competitive rival could match the discount, and it should be
legal.'
In addition to limiting its discounts so that they result in abovecost pricing under the discount attribution test, there are other ways a
bundled discounter might ensure that its conduct could not exclude
competitive rivals. Like a firm confronting a competitor's exclusive
dealing or tying, a single-product rival of a bundled discounter could
prevent its foreclosure by becoming a supplier to the discounter.197 If
the rival were at least as efficient as the bundled discounter, or would
become so by expanding to MES, it could offer to supply the
discounter for a price the discounter would find attractive (i.e., a price
at or below the discounter's own cost of producing and distributing
the product); if the rival were determined, it would make such an
offer, at least as a last resort. 198 A bundled discounter could thus avoid
lower its shampoo price to $1.00-a level below its own cost-in order to attract customers
who would have to pay the $4.00 unbundled price for A's conditioner.
194. Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 904 (9th Cir. 2008)
(describing the "aggregate discount" rule as one that "condemns bundled discounts as
anticompetitive only in the narrow cases in which the discounted price of the entire bundle
does not exceed the bundling firm's incremental cost to produce the entire bundle").
195. See Lambert, supra note 22, at 1700-05 (explaining why rule of per se legality for
above-cost bundled discounts is undesirable).
196. See Cascade Health Solutions, 515 F.3d at 906-08 (describing and adopting
discount attribution safe harbor).
197. See Lambert, supra note 22, at 1747-50 (explaining how a competitive rival could
avoid exclusion by a bundled discount by becoming a supplier to the discounter).
198. Small, regional airlines, facing threats of exclusion from what is essentially
bundled discounting, have successfully taken this tack. A significant impediment facing
such airlines is the major carriers' ability to engage in bundled discounting-to offer a
price for a "bundle" of flights going from departure point to hub to destination that is
significantly lower than the sum of the prices of two flights, one from departure point to
hub and the other from hub to destination. A smaller carrier servicing only one leg of the
journey (either between departure point and hub city or between hub city and destination,
but not both) would have to absorb the entire amount of the package discount on the
single leg it offered. That requirement could force the regional airline to price below its
cost. Despite this possibility, regional airlines have remained in business-and have
thrived-by becoming suppliers to the major carriers. See Eric Wieffering, Engine of
Change, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., May 11, 2003, at D6 (documenting successful supply
relationships between small regional and major air carriers and noting that "Northwest
[Airlines] and most other major network carriers experienced a decline in traffic in 2002
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excluding any competitive rival by expressing a willingness to accept
(and actually accepting) any favorable supplier offer from a rival
finding itself squeezed by the discount. As long as the discounter
could establish that it turned down only supply offers that were
unfavorable (on price or quality grounds), indicating that the offerors
were not "competitive," it could avoid liability for having excluded a
competitive rival.
2. Structuring a Rule of Reason Based on the ECR Definition of
Exclusionary Conduct
Having considered the safe harbors the ECR definition of
exclusionary conduct would generate, we now consider what litigation
structure-required showings, proof burdens, etc.-would best
implement the definition. Because the ECR definition ultimately
denies recovery absent a showing that the defendant's behavior has
excluded or is likely to exclude a competitive rival, one possible
approach would be to require every plaintiff in a monopolization or
attempted monopolization action to prove that it is a competitive
rival, much the way antitrust plaintiffs seeking monetary damages or
injunctive relief must establish antitrust injury 9 9 and antitrust
standing.2 " Such an approach, however, fails to account for the fact
that plaintiffs usually are not in the best position to make all the
showings necessary to establish their competitive-rival status. An
optimal rule of reason would instead put the burden on plaintiffs to
establish the competitive rival-related facts to which they are likely to
be privy while burdening defendants with proving those for which
they are more likely to possess the relevant evidence.

but traffic on most regional carriers soared"); Bill McGee, Regional Jets Crowd Skies,
Squeeze Fliers, USA TODAY (June 13, 2012), http://travel.usatoday.com/experts/mcgee
(observing that
/story/2012-06-14/Regional-jets-crowd-skies-squeeze-fliers/55584132/1
53% of nation's commercial airline departures are operated by regional airlines acting as
suppliers for major carriers). In similar fashion, single-product producers finding
themselves hampered by a bundled discount may be able to stay in business, and thrive, by
becoming suppliers to the discounter.
199. See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 113 (1986) (requiring
antitrust injury in private actions seeking injunctive relief); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo
Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977) (stating that to recover antitrust damages,
"[p]laintiffs must prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws
were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful"
(emphasis omitted)).
200. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters,
459 U.S. 519, 535 n.31 (1983) ("Harm to the antitrust plaintiff is sufficient to satisfy the
constitutional standing requirement of injury in fact, but the court must make a further
determination whether the plaintiff is a proper party to bring a private antitrust action.").
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Recall that competitive-rival status exists only where a rival is
both determined, meaning that it takes all reasonable efforts to
maintain and grow sales in the face of the defendant's conduct, and
technically competent, meaning that it is able to match the
defendant's efficiency when operating at MES. 201 Although a plaintiff
will normally possess evidence related to the former component (e.g.,
information on the steps it took to compete with the defendant's
allegedly exclusionary conduct), much of the evidence related to
whether it could match the defendant's efficiency when operating at
MES will reside with the defendant, who alone will know its own
production costs and thus whether the plaintiff's best supplier offer,
reflective of the plaintiff's efficiency at MES,202 was attractive.
In light of the likely distribution of evidence related to a
plaintiff's competitive-rival status, an optimal litigation structure
would place the initial burden on the plaintiff to establish that: (1) the
defendant's conduct somehow excluded or threatened to exclude the
plaintiff from the market and drive (or hold) it below MES; (2) the
plaintiff pursued all reasonable options for staying in the market at a
level where it could produce at MES, ultimately offering to supply the
defendant at a price approaching the plaintiff's incremental cost; and
(3) the defendant rejected plaintiff's offer. Such a showing, involving
evidence within the plaintiff's possession, would establish a
presumption that the plaintiff was a competitive rival excluded by the
defendant's action. The defendant could then rebut that presumption
by demonstrating that the plaintiff's supplier offer was unfavorable
because either the price offered exceeded the defendant's own cost or
the quality of the plaintiff's product or service was inferior.203 That
201. See supra Part II.B and notes 182-96 and accompanying text.
202. A determined rival would, if necessary to survive, lower its price to the level of its
incremental cost. A plaintiff claiming to be a determined rival can therefore be assumed to
have lowered its price under its supplier offer to a level reflecting what its incremental cost
would be if the offer were accepted and the plaintiff were permitted to grow to MES. If
the plaintiff would not achieve MES (or at least a scale sufficient to allow it to match the
defendant's efficiency) by becoming a supplier to the defendant, then market demand
must not warrant the plaintiff firm's existence (i.e., the number of firms in the market must
be inefficiently large), so that exit of the plaintiff firm would not occasion an efficiency
loss. See supra note 150.
203. In addition to rebutting the presumption of competitive-rival status, the defendant
could prevent such a presumption from arising by showing that the plaintiff failed to
pursue other reasonably available opportunities to maintain its scale. For example, in a
bundled discount case, the defendant might show that a less diversified plaintiff failed to
collaborate with other producers to assemble a competitive bundle that could have
competed with the defendant's. See infra note 252 and accompanying text. Establishing
that the plaintiff failed to pursue reasonable opportunities to maintain its scale would
negate the second prong of the plaintiffs required showing.
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demonstration, involving evidence within the defendant's possession,
would establish that the plaintiff was not, in fact, a competitive rival.
If the defendant could not make such a showing, however, the
presumption of competitive-rival status would stand.
Allocating proof burdens in this fashion would enable courts to
determine at the lowest possible administrative cost whether the
defendant's conduct as a whole excluded, or would likely exclude, a
competitive rival from the defendant's market. More importantly,
knowledge that this litigation structure would be used would enable
business planners to ensure against liability for monopolization or
attempted monopolization by considering all supplier offers from
allegedly excluded rivals and accepting any that would reduce, or at
least not increase, their firms' costs. Freed from concern about
antitrust liability, such business planners would be more willing to
pursue efficient but novel business practices and other conduct that
would enhance their output but whose immediate effect on rivals is
uncertain.
III. CRITICISMS OF THE ECR DEFINITION AND RESPONSES
THERETO

A.

Concerns About Underdeterrence

Critics of the ECR definition of unreasonably exclusionary
conduct will likely contend that embracing the definition, along with
the safe harbors and general litigation structure it would call for,
would lead to underdeterrence of Section 2 offenses. Some may
simply assert that the definition impairs deterrence by requiring
monopolization and attempted monopolization plaintiffs to make a
showing they previously have not had to make, namely, that they
took all reasonable steps to stay in business, ultimately offering to
supply the defendant at a price approaching their incremental cost.
This new requirement, however, replaces more difficult showings that
would be required under the other definitions of exclusionary
conduct and therefore does not increase the burden facing Section 2
plaintiffs. 20 Moreover, the notion that any increase in a Section 2
204. Under the other proposed definitions, the plaintiff would have to show that the
defendant's conduct either imposed unjustified costs on rivals (RRC), see supra notes 3845 and accompanying text, created consumer harm in excess of consumer benefit
(consumer welfare-balancing), see supra notes 46-55 and accompanying text, or was
economically irrational absent an increase in market power (no economic sense test), see
supra notes 82-92 and accompanying text. I am assuming, of course, that the law requires
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plaintiff's burden of proof impairs deterrence implicitly assumes that
optimal deterrence results from maximizing the number of private
enforcement actions. That is unlikely. Many private Section 2 actions
are non-meritorious strike suits that create administrative costs and
chill aggressive competition. One objective of the ECR definition's
additional requirement for plaintiffs is to weed out such lawsuits by
ensuring that plaintiffs first compete aggressively by making all
reasonable efforts to avoid exclusion before seeking antitrust's
assistance. Even if it reduces the total number of lawsuits, then, the
requirement will strengthen the degree to which Section 2 fosters
competition.
We turn, then, to three more persuasive reasons for worrying
that the ECR definition might result in underdeterrence. In turn, I
address (1) concerns that some truly competitive rivals could not
practicably make attractive supplier offers; (2) the possibility that
consumers would benefit from protecting some non-competitive
rivals; and (3) the intuition that monopolization doctrine should
police behaviors that extract consumer surplus, even if they are nonexclusionary.
1. Could Competitive Rivals that Do Not Currently Match the
Defendant's Efficiency Really Make Attractive Supplier Offers?
Critics may contend that many rivals that are not currently as
efficient as the defendant, but would be at MES, will be incapable of
making an attractive supplier offer and thus unable to establish their
competitive-rival status. If a plaintiff is not currently operating at
MES, then supplying the defendant at a price equivalent to the
plaintiff's (lower) cost at MES would require the plaintiff to price
below cost until the plaintiff achieves such scale. Consider, for
example, a rival that currently incurs a marginal cost of $15 but would
face a marginal cost of $13 if it were to expand production to MES.
Suppose that a defendant with a marginal cost of $14 engages in some
exclusionary business practice that reduces sales to the rival. If the
rival were to offer to supply the defendant at $13-the rival's cost
a monopolization or attempted monopolization plaintiff to establish that the conduct
complained of is unreasonably exclusionary. Current doctrine on some exclusionary
practices, such as tying, requires no such showing. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech.
Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461-62 (1992) (setting forth elements of quasi per se rule against
tying); Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 499-503 (1969) (discussing at
length the application of the quasi per se rule against tying). With respect to such
practices, the ECR definition may raise a plaintiffs proof burden, but it would also
ensure-unlike the prevailing liability rule-that only truly anticompetitive practices
would give rise to liability.
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when operating at MES-the defendant would likely accept the offer
and the rival would stay in business. But since the rival's current
marginal cost is $15, supplying to the defendant at any price below
that level would require the rival to sustain immediate losses. If the
rival could not obtain financing to cover those losses and expand its
operations to MES, it would not be in a position to make an attractive
supplier offer to the defendant even though it would surpass the
defendant's efficiency at MES. As explained above, the ECR
definition assumes that a rival that could eventually match or exceed
a defendant's efficiency could obtain the financing necessary to grow
to MES and, in the meantime, cover any losses from below-cost
pricing.205 But such an assumption, critics are likely to argue, may

involve excessive optimism about the efficacy of capital markets.206
For one thing, a determined rival with the technical capability to
match or exceed a defendant's efficiency at MES may face a
"chicken-or-egg" dilemma. Providers of capital may refuse to finance
the rival's expansion and period of below-cost pricing if it has not yet
secured the supplier agreement that will guarantee demand for its
expansion-level output; yet, a dominant firm may be reluctant to
enter such an agreement with the rival absent some guarantee that
expansion financing can be obtained. In other words, the supplier
contract is a pre-requisite to expansion financing, but expansion
financing is a pre-requisite to securing the supplier contract.
This apparent difficulty is easily remedied through the use of
contracts incorporating conditional promises. Just as a prospective
homebuyer may extend an offer that, if accepted, would bind her to
purchase a new home if certain conditions are satisfied (e.g., if she is
able to obtain financing at a specified interest rate by a certain date),
a competitive rival could make an offer that, if accepted, would bind
it to supply the dominant firm at a price equal to or below the
defendant's cost if the rival secured expansion financing on
acceptable terms.2" If the dominant firm were to accept, the rival
would be in a good position to obtain expansion financing. If
expansion financing turned out not to be available, the deal would be
off; the rival's failure to supply would not constitute a breach on its
205. See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
206. See, e.g., Richard R. Nelson, Comments on a Paper by Posner, 127 U. PA. L. REV.
949, 950 (1979) ("The Chicago proposition that scale economies don't serve as a barrier to
entry hinges on explicit or implicit assumptions about perfect capital markets and no
adjustment lags or costs.").
207. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §224 (1979) (defining
"condition").
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part (the condition to its promise being unsatisfied), 208 nor would the
dominant firm's failure to purchase from the rival constitute a breach
(the rival's performance being a constructive condition of the
dominant firm's duty). 20 9 Thus, the chicken-or-egg problem should
not preclude a competitive rival from staying in business by supplying
a dominant defendant.2 10
There may be a more significant problem, though, for belowMES rivals that upon achieving MES would only match-not
exceed-the dominant firm's efficiency. A dominant defendant would
be willing to accept such a rival's supplier offer only if the rival
charged a price equal to its marginal cost.2 11 But if the rival earned
only its marginal cost at MES, it might be able to cover the
incremental cost of producing each unit but could not afford to
service its growth financing (e.g., any debt it took on to achieve
MES). Thus, it could not obtain the funds needed to grow to the point
at which it would match the defendant's efficiency.
While this may be a theoretical difficulty for the ECR definition,
it is likely to matter little in practice. The matter is of course
irrelevant for rivals already operating at MES. Any rival that had
achieved that level of output and could match the defendant's
efficiency should be able to make an attractive supplier offer (or, in
the case of predation, to match the defendant's pricing) and thereby
maintain its scale. Nor would the difficulty afflict rivals that are not
operating at MES but would have a substantial efficiency advantage
at that level of output; any such rival should be able to finance its
expansion.2 12 A rival that would only match the defendant's efficiency
at MES but would be able to make sales outside the venture (i.e., to
customers other than the defendant) at prices in excess of its
incremental cost could use the profits from non-venture sales to
finance its expansion. Thus, the only context in which the problem at
208. See generally id. § 225 (discussing effect of non-occurrence of condition).
209. See generally id. § 237 (discussing required performances as constructive
conditions of exchange).
210. The drafting requirements and uncertainties involved in executing these sorts of
contingent agreements would, of course, raise transaction costs. But, given the widespread
use of similar contingent agreements in other contexts, one would not expect such costs to
thwart supplier arrangements that would otherwise be mutually beneficial.
211. Any price greater than a price equal to a dominant defendant's marginal cost
would not be favorable to the defendant, which would be better off producing the product
itself.
212. The rival could offer to supply the defendant at some amount less than the
defendant's cost but greater than its own (at MES), and the defendant would accept. After
achieving MES, the rival would earn revenues in excess of its costs and could therefore
service its expansion financing.
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issue matters is one in which a below-MES rival would, at MES, at
least match the defendant's efficiency but (1) would not have a
sufficient efficiency advantage to service expansion financing and (2)
would not be able to make sales outside the supply agreement at
prices sufficient to service expansion financing. In such circumstances,
though, the rival's continued existence in the market would provide
little in the way of consumer benefit. If the defendant were charging
above-cost prices, the rival's presence would be beneficial. But in that
case, the rival ought to be able to sell outside the venture (at a price
equal to or just below the defendant's) and use the incremental
revenue above its cost to finance its expansion. If the rival could not
do so, then the defendant must be charging a price very near its cost,
in which case the presence of an equally efficient rival that would
charge, at best, the same price would provide no significant consumer
benefit. It seems, then, that there is little reason to worry that truly
competitive rivals would be unable to make the sort of supplier offers
necessary to establish liability under the ECR approach.
2. Shouldn't Antitrust Protect Even Non-Competitive Rivals?
Under the ECR definition, a firm is free to engage in any nonnaked (mixed bag) unilateral practice that would exclude only rivals
that could not, at MES, match or exceed the defendant's efficiency.
Such non-competitive rivals, though, may be the only competition
likely to materialize in a particular market. Accordingly, the ECR
definition is subject to a criticism often levied against Judge Posner's
more permissive equally efficient rival definition, namely, that it
could create social costs in the form of allocative inefficiencies by
improperly acquitting acts that cause the exclusion of rivals whose
market presence would discipline dominant firms.213
The mere fact that a proposed antitrust rule may result in false
acquittals and consequent allocative inefficiency, however, does not
imply that the rule is socially undesirable. In the presence of
incomplete information and limited predictive abilities, every liability
rule is prone to occasional error and is thus likely to create some
social cost from false acquittals or false convictions. 214 To demonstrate
213. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
214. See Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, If Search Neutrality Is the Answer,
What's the Question?, 2012 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 151, 184-85 ("The key challenge facing
any proposed analytical framework for evaluating monopolization claims is distinguishing
pro-competitive from anticompetitive conduct. Antitrust errors are inevitable because
much of what is potentially actionable conduct under the antitrust laws frequently actually
benefits consumers, and generalist judges are called upon to identify anticompetitive
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that a proposed liability rule is suboptimal, a critic must show that
some other rule would entail lower total error costs while keeping
administrative costs in check.215 It is not enough, then, for critics to
show that the ECR definition creates error cost by wrongly acquitting
conduct that could exclude or impair some non-competitive rivals
whose unimpeded participation in the market would benefit
consumers. Instead, such critics must further establish that it is
possible to craft a broader liability rule that would condemn such
conduct without generating other error costs that exceed those
purportedly created by the ECR definition. They likely could not do
so.
While the ECR definition may generate some false acquittals
and thereby occasion allocative inefficiency, broader liability rulesthose that would afford protection to some set of noncompetitive
rivals--create risks of false convictions and could deter many
instances of efficient, but novel, conduct. To see this point, consider a
firm that is considering a somewhat novel business practice that is
efficient on the whole but capable of usurping business from rivals
and thereby possibly reducing their efficiency or driving them from
the market. Suppose, for example, that a manufacturer possessing
market power desires to make investments in its multi-brand dealers'
outlets but is concerned about free-riding by other manufacturers.2 16
To induce loyalty and prevent inter-brand free-riding, the
manufacturer offers a 15% discount (still resulting in an above-cost
price) to retailers that agree to carry at least 80% of their
requirements in the manufacturer's brand for a three-year period. For
retailers that accept the offer, the manufacturer could expect low
levels of inter-brand free-riding, and it would therefore make
significant sales-enhancing, consumer-friendly investments in those
retailers' outlets.
Under the consumer welfare-balancing, RRC, and sacrificebased definitions, a manufacturer considering this efficient course of
action could have no confidence that its conduct would not be
conduct with imperfect information."). See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Problems With
Minimalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1899, 1913 (2006) ("When the Court lacks relevant
information, so that any rule will predictably misfire, rules are hazardous.").
215. See Easterbrook, supra note 115, at 16 ("The legal system should be designed to
minimize the total costs of (1) anticompetitive practices that escape condemnation; (2)
competitive practices that are condemned or deterred; and (3) the system itself."). See
generally Lambert, supra note 115, at 874-79 (setting forth decision-theoretic approach to
crafting antitrust liability rules).
216. See supra note 143 and accompanying text (discussing possibility of "inter-brand
free-riding").
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deemed unreasonably exclusionary. Under a consumer welfarebalancing approach, a jury might find that the consumer harm from
reducing the scale of some rivals would exceed the consumer benefits
of lower immediate prices and output-enhancing investments in
compliant dealers' outlets.217 Under the RRC and no economic sense
approaches, a jury could easily determine that some increment of the
defendant's conduct either reduced rivals' scale and increased their
costs unjustifiably or would have made no economic sense but for its
exclusionary effect. For example, under the RRC approach, a jury
might conclude that the level of loyalty necessary to justify the
manufacturers' investments in its dealers could have been achieved
with a 10% (rather than 15%) loyalty discount, or a 15% discount
triggered by only 70% (rather than 80%) loyalty, or a discount like
the one utilized but requiring only a two-year (not three-year)
commitment. Any "unnecessary" part of the discount scheme-the
incremental 5% discount above 10% off, the additional loyalty
required above 70%, or the third year of commitment-would be
unnecessary to achieve efficiency benefits and thus could have
involved "unjustified" raising of the costs of any rivals who suffered
sales losses and thus potentially lost scale efficiencies.2 18 Under the no
economic sense test, a jury might conclude that similar incremental
parts of the discount scheme were unnecessary to achieve the loyalty
required to justify dealer investments and thus would have made no
economic sense but for their ability to exclude rivals and thereby
permit future supracompetitive pricing. 219 Thus, the consumer
welfare-balancing, RRC, and sacrifice-based approaches-and any
other approach that aims to select some non-competitive rivals for
protection under the antitrust laws-cannot generate reliable
guidance and safe harbors for business planners and will thus deter
conduct that is efficient on the whole but capable of causing some
exclusion.
The key question, then, is whether the allocative inefficiency
occasioned by the failure of the ECR definition to protect some noncompetitive rivals would exceed the productive efficiency losses
broader liability rules would occasion. There are at least two reasons
to believe the ECR definition produces lower total error cost. First,
217. See supra notes 46-47, 62-68 and accompanying text (criticizing shortcomings of
consumer welfare-balancing approach).
218. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text (describing limitations of RRC
approach).
219. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text (describing the failures of the no
economic sense test).

1236

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92

the adverse effect of the ECR definition-enhanced market power
resulting from a reduction of price discipline on the dominant firmtends to be self-correcting, while the adverse effect of broader
liability rules-the chilling of efficient (but exclusion-causing)
business practices-is not. Market power invites entry and is difficult
to sustain. 220 The chilling from a judicial decision wrongly condemning
an efficient business practice, by contrast, can be eliminated only by
subsequent judicial or legislative action. Thus, less social cost is
generally created by failing to condemn some market powerenhancing practices than by wrongly condemning some efficient
mixed bag practices and thereby discouraging their use throughout
the economy.221
In addition, any underdeterrence caused by the ECR definition is
of less concern than the other approaches' overdeterrence because
significant overdeterrence is already built into the scheme for
privately
enforcing
the
monopolization
and
attempted
monopolization provisions of the antitrust laws. To account for the
fact that many antitrust violations-most notably, price-fixing
conspiracies-occur in secret and thus frequently escape
punishment,222 the private enforcement provisions of the antitrust
laws aim to achieve optimal (or at least better) deterrence by
providing for treble damages. 21 The exclusionary acts giving rise to
monopolization and attempted monopolization claims, however, are
almost always conducted publicly-not in secret-so the generally
applicable treble damage provision of the antitrust laws tends to
220. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986)
("[I]t is not enough simply to achieve monopoly power, as monopoly pricing may breed
quick entry by new competitors eager to share in the excess profits."); Easterbrook, supra
note 115, at 2 ("Monopoly is self-destructive. Monopoly prices eventually attract entry.")
221. As Judge Easterbrook famously explained,
A fundamental difficulty facing [an antitrust] court is the incommensurability of
the stakes. If the court errs by condemning a beneficial practice, the benefits may
be lost for good. Any other firm that uses the condemned practice faces sanctions
in the name of stare decisis, no matter the benefits. If the court errs by permitting
a [deleterious] practice, though, the welfare loss decreases over time. Monopoly is
self-destructive. Monopoly prices eventually attract entry. True, this long run may
be a long time coming, with loss to society in the interim. The central purpose of
antitrust is to speed up the arrival of the long run. But this should not obscure the
point: judicial errors that tolerate baleful practices are self-correcting, while
erroneous condemnations are not.
Easterbrook, supra note 115, at 2-3.
222. See POSNER, supra note 10, at 271.
223. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012); see also HOVENKAMP, supra note 77, at 66 (explaining
policy rationale for trebling antitrust damages).
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occasion overdeterrence in the Section 2 context.224 A somewhat
underdeterrent liability rule, like that resulting from the ECR
definition, could help correct this flaw.
In the end, then, the ECR definition-even if imperfect in that it
would allow for the exclusion of some non-competitive rivals whose
continued existence might benefit consumers-likely produces less
consumer harm (lower total error costs) than broader liability rules
aimed at protecting some set of non-competitive rivals. Because it
also appears to be easier to administer than the other approaches
(i.e., to entail lower decision costs), the ECR definition seems to
prevail over the other approaches in terms of the decision-theoretic
criterion set forth above.225
3. What About Adverse Consumer Effects from Unilateral Conduct
that, While Not Exclusionary, Results in Price Discrimination and
Surplus Extraction?
The ECR definition of exclusionary conduct assumes that
anticompetitive harm resulting from an instance of actual or
attempted monopolization requires the exclusion of a rival-either its
complete exclusion from the market or a foreclosure-induced
reduction in its scale and thus its competitiveness. Some scholars
contend, however, that anticompetitive harms properly policed by
monopolization doctrine include non-exclusionary effects that result
in price discrimination and/or increased extraction of surplus by
producers at the expense of consumers.226 If monopolization doctrine
should, in fact, pursue practices that do not exclude rivals but do
result in price discrimination or surplus extraction, then the ECR
definition, which assigns liability only if the exclusion of a competitive
rival is likely, may under-deter. In actuality, however, prevailing
monopolization doctrine does not (as a descriptive matter) and
should not (as a normative matter) pursue non-exclusionary, but price
discriminatory or surplus extractive, effects.
The non-exclusionary effects in question generally result from
vertical restraints of trade, most frequently tying. In certain
circumstances, even non-exclusionary instances of tying (i.e.,
instances that do not result in substantial foreclosure from the tied
224. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 77, at 66-68; POSNER, supra note 10, at 271-73.
225. See supra note 115 and accompanying text (setting forth decision-theoretic
criterion for optimal definition of unreasonably exclusionary conduct).
226. See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 22, at 420-26 (arguing that Supreme Court
precedent deems nonforeclosure price discrimination effects to be anticompetitive); id. at
426-42 (arguing that such effects should be deemed anticompetitive).
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product market) may nevertheless result in price discrimination or
surplus extraction in favor of the tying defendant. 2 27 For example, in a
variable proportion tie-in of a complementary product-e.g., a
requirement by the producer of a patented and unique photocopier
that buyers of its monopoly copier also purchase its unpatented inka monopolist may enhance its own profits by effectively price
discriminating against high-volume users of its monopoly product,
who likely value the product the most. 228 Similarly, sellers (or
licensors) of multiple low-marginal cost goods-frequently
"information" goods like software, television programming, music, or
movies229-may enhance their own profit and reduce consumer
surplus by selling the goods in bundles, effectively tying them
together. 23 0 In both situations, the tie-ins may have price
227. See id. at 404-13 (setting forth potential non-foreclosure "power" effects that may
transfer surplus from consumers to producer).
228. The manufacturer of the photocopier could lower its price (elevated above cost
because of the machine's unique features) but require purchasers to use only the
manufacturer's brand of ink, for which it would then charge a supracompetitive price.
Because it earns its monopoly profits on the ink rather than the machine, the seller would
end up charging high-use buyers a higher effective price than low-use buyers, who likely
ascribe a lower value to the copier. Output would be higher than if the seller charged a
single monopoly price for the machine, for some lower-use consumers who valued the
copier below the single-product monopoly price but above its cost would now buy it.
However, more of the surplus-the difference between the copier's cost and price-would
go to the manufacturer. See Lambert, supra note 36, at 917 (describing so-called
"metering" tie-ins); id. at 935-50 (explaining why metering tie-ins generally enhance total
welfare).
229. An "information good" is generally defined as "anything that can be digitized,"
such as a movie, song, book, or computer program. See CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R.
VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE NETWORK ECONOMY 3

(1999).
230. Where demand for the tied-together goods is not strongly positively correlated,
bundling in this fashion can enhance the monopolist's profits via surplus extraction. See
Elhauge, supra note 22, at 405-07, 419-20. In United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38
(1962), for example, the defendants, distributors of motion pictures, enhanced their profits
by requiring licensees to take films in packages. See George Stigler, United States v.
Loew's Inc.: A Note on Block-Booking, 1963 SUP. CT. REV. 152, 152. To visualize the
block-booking strategy utilized, suppose that a monopolist film distributor has two films,
"The British Patient" ("TBP") and "Porkee's," and two customers, Arthouse and
Cineplex. Arthouse values highbrow TBP at $8,000 and low-brow Porkee's at $2,500;
Cineplex values TBP at $7,000 and Porkee's at $3,000. If the marginal cost of licensing
each film is zero and the distributor licenses the films separately, it would do best by
charging $7,000 for TBP and $2,500 for Porkee's, earning profits of $19,000 ($9,500 * 2).
But by tying the films together (i.e., licensing them as a bundle), the distributor could
charge $10,000 per customer, an amount less than or equal to each customer's reservation
price for the package, thereby earning profits of $20,000. Absent the tie-in, Arthouse
would have enjoyed surplus of $1,000 on TBP, and Cineplex would have enjoyed surplus
of $500 on Porkee's; the tying transfers $1,000 of consumer surplus to the distributor. See
POSNER, supra note 10, at 235 ("When the products are priced separately, the price is
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discriminatory or surplus extractive effects even if they do not
foreclose rivals from the market or reduce their scale at all.231
Accordingly, scholars such as Professor Elhauge have argued that
tying liability, which may arise under the monopolization and
attempted monopolization provisions of Section 2 of the Sherman
Act, should result even in situations not involving foreclosure
(exclusion) of the tying defendant's rivals.232 Because the ECR
definition would preclude liability for actual or attempted
monopolization absent such exclusion, these scholars would contend
that it is underdeterrent.
It is unlikely, though, that current law deems the nonexclusionary but price discriminatory or surplus extractive effects of
unilateral business practices to be "anticompetitive" effects.
Admittedly, the Supreme Court has spoken somewhat equivocally on
this matter. Purporting to state "the rationale on which the illegality
of tying arrangements is based," a 1969 dissent by Justice White
mentioned that such arrangements "may be used [as in the
photocopier example 233] ... as a counting device to effect price
discrimination; and they may be used [as in Loew'S23 4] to force a full
line of products on the customer so as to extract more easily from him
a monopoly return on one unique product in the line."2 35
Subsequently, those words were quoted favorably in a majority
opinion, in which the Court went on to observe that tying "can
increase the social costs of market power by facilitating price
discrimination, thereby increasing monopoly profits over what they
would be absent the tie." 23 6 Elhauge has pointed to such statements as
grounds for concluding that non-exclusionary, surplus extractive
effects are anticompetitive and appropriately give rise to antitrust
liability.2 37

depressed by the buyer who values each one less than the other buyer does; the bundling
eliminates this effect.").
231. See Elhauge, supra note 22, at 404-13 (describing potential non-foreclosure effects
of tie-ins).
232. See id. at Part IV (arguing that tying's surplus-extractive and price discriminatory
effects should be deemed anticompetitive even when they do not occasion substantial
market foreclosure).
233. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
234. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
235. Fortner Enters. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 513-14 (1969) (White, J.,
dissenting).
236. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 14-15 (1984).
237. See Elhauge, supra note 22, at 423.

1240

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92

The Supreme Court's 2006 decision in Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v.

Independent Ink,238 however, rejected the notion that tying's price
discrimination and surplus extraction effects are anticompetitive.2 39
The plaintiff in that case asked the Court to rule (as an alternative to
plaintiff's broader requested holding) that tying market power will be
presumed when a defendant with a patent on its tying product
imposes a "requirements tie," mandating that purchasers also buy
their requirements of unpatented complements from the defendant.2 4
In an amicus brief cited by the Court, a group of professors pressed
for such a rule, contending that the presumption of tying market
power in cases involving patented tying products and requirements
ties would enable antitrust to police the use of tie-ins to price
discriminate and earn greater profits for sellers.241 Such price
discrimination and surplus extraction, the professors argued, are
anticompetitive effects that are properly addressed by antitrust.242 The
Court, however, was not persuaded. Although it conceded that
metering tie-ins may result in price discrimination, referencing its
prior acknowledgement of that point, 243 the Court rejected the ruling
advocated by the amici professors because it concluded that price
discrimination "occurs in fully competitive markets" and that "[m]any
tying arrangements, even those involving patents and requirements
ties, are fully consistent with a free, competitive market." 24 The
Court thus indicated that non-exclusionary price discrimination and
surplus extraction, while possible effects of tying, are not to be
deemed "anticompetitive" effects.
Nor should they be. As I have explained elsewhere, metering tieins are a form of second-degree price discrimination that usually
enhances total welfare. 24 5 Even if they are conceived as instances of
third-degree price discrimination, which sometimes reduces total
238. 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
239. Id. at 45.
240. Id. at 43-44 (discussing alternative narrower holding requested by plaintiff, which
had also asked the Court to hold more broadly that tying market power should be
assumed whenever the tying product is patented).
241. Brief of Professors Barry Nalebuff, Ian Ayres, and Lawrence Sullivan as Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondent at 4, Indep. Ink, 547 U.S. 28 (No. 04-1329), 2005 WL
2427646, at *4 (cited by Supreme Court in Indep. Ink, 547 U.S. at 44).
242. Id. at *18-*27 (section of brief entitled "The Use of Tying as a Metering Device
Implicates Serious Antitrust Concerns").
243. Indep. Ink, 547 U.S. at 44 (citing Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466
U.S. 2, 15 n.23 (1984)).
244. Id. at 45.
245. See Lambert, supra note 36, at 935-41; see also Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra
note 146, at 943-52 (discussing efficiency of metering tie-ins).
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welfare, 246 the metering tie-ins generally observed in actual practice
tend to expand market output and thereby enhance total welfare.247
Bundling tie-ins of the sort involved in Loew's also tend to enhance
total welfare. 2 48 They do so by enabling producers of goods with very
low marginal costs to set prices that will permit use by all consumers
attaching an above-cost value to the goods but still provide the seller
with enough revenue to cover the total cost of producing the goods.249
In addition to these improvements in static efficiency, both types of
tie-ins-metering and Loew's-type bundling-enhance dynamic
efficiency. By enabling the entrepreneur to capture a greater portion
of the surplus her innovation creates, tying-induced price
discrimination and surplus extraction increase the reward for
developing unique products and services and thereby encourage
innovation. 250 The Supreme Court was therefore correct to conclude
that non-exclusionary but price discriminatory or surplus extractive
business practices are not anticompetitive. The ECR definition
appropriately requires actual or likely exclusion as a prerequisite to
liability.
B.

ConcernsAbout Collusion

The Supreme Court has warned that "compelling negotiation
between competitors may facilitate the supreme evil of antitrust:
collusion." 25 1 Because the ECR definition encourages firms to avoid
246. See Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 146, at 927-37 (explaining how thirddegree price discrimination may, under certain circumstances, reduce total surplus).
247. See Lambert, supra note 36, at 941-50.
248. See supra note 230 (discussing use of tying to extract consumer surplus in United
States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962)).
249. See Lambert, supra note 36, at 950-53.
250. See id. at 953-59. Innovators' inability to capture more than a fraction of the
surplus their efforts produce tends to retard innovation. By transferring to the innovator
more of the value she produces, tying-induced price discrimination and surplus extraction
help mitigate this positive externality and thereby encourage innovation. See Benjamin
Klein & John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Competitive Price Discrimination as an Antitrust
Justificationfor Intellectual Property Refusals to Deal, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 599, 619 (2003)
("[P]rice discrimination allows producers to recoup more of the social value of their
innovations and thereby leads to more innovation.").
251. Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408
(2004). Note also, however, the Court's insinuation in the same opinion that a dominant
firm's refusal to accept a rival's offer to enter a venture that would enhance both overall
market output and the dominant firm's own profits may evince an anticompetitive scheme
on the part of the dominant firm. See id. at 409 (distinguishing Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen
Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985), on grounds that that "defendant's unilateral
termination of a voluntary (and thus presumablyprofitable) course of dealing suggested a
willingness to forsake short-term profits to achieve an anticompetitive end" and observing
that defendant's "unwillingness to renew the ticket even if compensated at retail price
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exclusion or scale reductions by negotiating with and perhaps
becoming suppliers to their rivals, critics will likely contend that it
flouts the Court's warning and may lead to consumer harm.
Consider, for example, a dominant firm that engages in
exclusion-causing conduct but avoids Section 2 liability by accepting a
competitive rival's supplier offer, thereby enabling the rival to
maintain MES. Suppose the dominant firm then reduces its own
output by more than the amount the rival supplied and raises its price
to a supracompetitive level. Such a strategy would fail if the supplier
rival remained free to sell directly to the dominant firm's customers;
the supracompetitive price would induce the rival to expand its own
output and undersell the dominant firm. But suppose the dominant
firm strikes a deal to share its monopoly profits with the rival (e.g., by
increasing the amount paid under the supplier agreement or by
making some sort of side payment) in exchange for the rival's
restraining its own production. By encouraging excluded rivals to
negotiate supplier deals with dominant firms, critics may contend, the
ECR definition would facilitate this sort of collusion.
There is little reason to worry, though, that the ECR definition
will cause the proliferation of these sorts of arrangements. As an
initial matter, actual supplier agreements between exclusion-causing
dominant firms and their rivals will probably be rare. If a rival could
find any other means to maintain its scale, it would likely do so;252
extending a supplier offer to the exclusion-causing firm will usually be
a last resort.253 Moreover, if the supplier offer is unattractive,
indicating that the rival could not match the defendant's efficiency at
revealed a distinctly anticompetitive bent" and "suggest[ed] a calculation that its future
monopoly retail price would be higher").
252. For example, a single-product rival facing exclusion by a dominant firm's bundled
discount might be able to avoid exclusion by collaborating with other producers to offer a
competing bundled discount. See Lambert, supra note 22, at 1746-47 (explaining how
single-product rival could compete against bundled discount via collaborative bundle with
other producers); Hovenkamp, supra note 22, at 855 (noting that there is no liability for
bundling "if the market contains at least one other significant firm that offers the same
package that the defendant is discounting").
253. Because a dominant firm engaged in exclusion-causing conduct could avoid
liability by either (1) accepting or demonstrating the unattractiveness of a rival's supplier
offer (the former would avoid exclusion altogether; the latter would rebut the
presumption that the plaintiff is a competitive rival) or (2) demonstrating that plaintiff
failed to avail itself of some other reasonably available opportunity to achieve or maintain
MES (doing so would prevent the presumption of plaintiff's competitive-rival status from
arising), see supra note 203 and accompanying text, plaintiffs seeking to establish
unreasonable exclusion under the ECR definition will generally pursue all other
reasonably available opportunities to avoid exclusion before seeking to become a supplier
to the defendant.
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MES and thus is not a competitive rival, the dominant firm will not
accept it. Most likely, the number of supplier offers extended
(because the rival can find no other way to maintain its scale in the
face of the defendant's conduct) and accepted (because the rival is
truly competitive with the defendant) will be relatively small.
Of that small number, those resulting in the sort of collusion
described above would be easily policed under other provisions of the
antitrust laws. Such arrangements are naked horizontal-output
restraints and are per se illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.254
Moreover, when adopted in connection with the sort of supplier
agreements encouraged by the ECR definition, they would be easy to
identify. Any reduction in output and increase in price by a dominant
firm entering a supplier agreement with a rival would occasion
suspicion. Absent a compelling justification for the dominant firm's
output reduction and the rival's failure to expand its own output in
the face of rising prices, an inference of collusion-and liability under
Sherman Act Section 1-would be warranted. There is little reason to
avoid an exclusionary conduct definition on grounds that it would
encourage negotiation among competitors when any resulting
collusive arrangements would be both rare and easily identified and
condemned.25 5
CONCLUSION

In the introduction to his classic 1978 book, The Antitrust
Paradox,Robert Bork bemoaned the prevailing state of antitrust by
comparing it to the sheriff of an old west frontier town: "[H]e did not
sift evidence, distinguish between suspects, and solve crimes, but
merely walked the main street and every so often pistol-whipped a
few people."" Antitrust as a whole has come a long way since Bork
penned those words. The rules governing horizontal and vertical
restraints of trade, mergers, and even specific instances of
monopolization-e.g., price squeezes, predatory pricing, unilateral
refusals to deal-are far more coherent and economically
sophisticated than they were back in Bork's bad old days.

254. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223-24 (1940)
(holding that an agreement among competitors to reduce output, like an agreement to fix
prices, is per se illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act).
255. Cf Easterbrook, supra note 40, at 347 ("Instead of making predictions that are
impossible to test-and will injure consumers if wrong-wait to see what happens. If
monopolistic prices happen later, prosecute then.").
256. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 36, at 6.
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Yet, the law on monopolization and attempted monopolization
retains some of that "frontier sheriff" feel because courts and
commentators have never satisfactorily articulated the quality that
makes any particular instance of exclusion-causing activity legally
problematic. Until that matter is addressed-and in a way that
provides real guidance to business planners-dominant firms run
some risk of getting pistol-whipped whenever they engage in conduct
that may enhance their output but also occasion some rival exclusion.
Knowing this, they will tend to hold their competitive punches, to the
detriment of consumers.
Drawing lessons from past, unsuccessful attempts to define
unreasonably exclusionary conduct, this Article has set forth a
definition that identifies a common thread tying together all instances
of unreasonable exclusion, comports with widely accepted intuitions
about what constitutes improper competitive conduct, and generates
specific safe harbors and liability rules that would collectively
minimize the sum of antitrust's decision and error costs. Critics will
likely assert that the proposed "exclusion of a competitive rival"
approach is radical and underdeterrent, but it is far less so than
proposals by prominent antitrust scholars to scrap the monopolization
prohibition altogether27 or to define unreasonably exclusionary
conduct according to the equally efficient rival standard.? Moreover,
it is the only proposed exclusionary conduct definition (other than the
under-deterrent equally efficient rival definition) that could really put
antitrust's frontier sheriff out of business. Surely he has earned his
retirement.

257. See id. at 406 ("[Antitrust law] should abandon its concern with such beneficial
practices as small horizontal mergers, all vertical and conglomerate mergers, vertical price
maintenance and market division, tying arrangements, exclusive dealing and requirements
contracts, 'predatory' price-cutting, price 'discrimination,' and the like."); POSNER, supra
note 36, at 212 ("I would like to see the antitrust laws other than Section 1 of the Sherman
Act repealed.").
258. See POSNER, supra note 10, at 194-95.

